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ABSTRACT
In the approaches seen at the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear
program, why did states faced with the same security problem adopt different
strategies? Answering this question will bring understanding to why the process has
proceeded in fits and starts, as the countries negotiating with Pyongyang - China,
Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States - often struggle to coordinate
strategy in their quest to resolve a grave issue of international security.
This paper approaches the question by taking up three possible drivers behind
strategy among the five negotiating countries - realist calculations, domestic political
institutions, and national identity - and, tracing each country's strategy within the
talks, identifies the most likely of these drivers for each state.
This study finds that while the United States, China, and Russia bring primarily
realist concerns to the table, they employ separate strategies toward the North
Korean nuclear issue, reflecting differing drivers and goals. In addition, South Korea
and Japan see their strategies driven by issues related to national identity and
domestic politics. In looking at the origins of these drivers, this study finds that
China's realist drive stems largely from its particular vision of economic and
geopolitical growth; Japan's push for a resolution to the kidnapping issue stems from
politicians' aim for domestic political popularity made easier through Japan's lack of a
history of relations with North Korea; Russia's realist drive derives from the Putin-led
push to regain a semblance of its historical sphere of influence; South Korea's focus
on peninsular engagement comes from a renewed nationalism, its legacy as a
"divided nation," and a reimagining of the North Korea threat; and the United States'
concentration on realist factors is derived from unique aspects of the post-September
11, 2001 security environment as well as a reassertion of regional goals that
underscores U.S.-China competition.
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"Each state pursues its own interests, however defined, in ways it judges best. Force is
a means of achieving the external ends of states because there exists no consistent,
reliable process of reconciling the conflicts of interests that inevitably arise among
similar units in a condition of anarchy." - Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War1
"There is no magic formula for managing a rising challenger and maintaining
international peace and stability. [...] Even if the status quo defenders are fortunate
enough to operate within an international structure conducive to successful
management, they must still search for the right policy devices to keep the peace,
maintain the integrity of the system, and ultimately convert the revisionist state into a
status quo one. Moreover, the success of any effort to manage a power transition is
largely a function of factors that are internal to the rising and declining powers
themselves." - Randall Schweller, "Managing the Rise of Great Powers" 2
I. Introduction
In the approaches seen at the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear program, why did
states faced with the same security problem adopt different strategies? Answering this question
will bring understanding to why the process has proceeded in fits and starts, as the countries
negotiating with Pyongyang - China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States - often
struggle to coordinate strategy in their quest to resolve a grave issue of international security.
Existing studies have taken a comparative approach to the strategies each party brings to
the talks. While these accounts begin to address how the six parties have had trouble matching
approaches, they prove inadequate to explain why states would possess preferences leading to the
particular strategic choices. This paper approaches the question by taking up three possible
drivers behind strategy among the five negotiating countries - realist calculations, domestic
political institutions, and national identity - and, tracing each country's strategy within the talks,
identifies the most likely of these drivers for each state.
This study finds that while the United States, China, and Russia bring primarily realist
concerns to the table, they employ separate strategies toward the North Korean nuclear issue,
reflecting differing drivers and goals. In addition, South Korea and Japan see their strategies
i Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York, Columbia University Press,
1959), p. 238. (Emphasis mine.)
2 Randall Schweller, "Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory," in Alastair lain Johnston
and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London, UK:
Routledge, 1999), p. 25. (Emphasis mine.)
driven by issues related to national identity and domestic politics. In looking at the origins of
these drivers, this study finds that China's realist drive stems largely from its particular vision of
economic and geopolitical growth; Japan's push for a resolution to the kidnapping issue stems
from politicians' aim for domestic political popularity made easier through Japan's lack of a
history of relations with North Korea; Russia's realist drive derives from the Vladimir Putin-led
push to regain a semblance of its historical sphere of influence; South Korea's focus on
peninsular engagement comes from a renewed nationalism, its legacy as a "divided nation," and a
reimagining of the North Korea threat; and the United States' concentration on realist factors is
derived from unique aspects of the post-September 11, 2001 security environment as well as a
reassertion of regional goals that underscores U.S.-China competition.
The major implications of these findings are twofold. First, the United States' realist-
based model of hub and spokes alliances is ineffective in a multilateral format if its alliance
partners, South Korea and Japan, hold domestic concerns that trump the goals of the alliance, nor
if China's regional role as rising power is not taken into account. Second, although policymakers
in China, Russia, and the United States hold primarily realist concerns, this does not mean they
necessarily agree as to the greatest threat they face - thus, the direct North Korea threat may be
secondary to calculations of relative power maximization.
On June 27, 2008, television screens flashed with the image of North Korea's Yongbyon
nuclear cooling tower as it crumbled to dust. While largely a symbolic gesture - the tower can
easily be rebuilt, and Pyongyang has already tested a nuclear device - the implosion marked a
major symbolic gesture toward North Korea's intent to denuclearize.3
This symbolic gesture was also five years and six rounds of diplomatic talks in the
making. The six-party talks, a series of meetings in Beijing involving the two Koreas, Japan,
Russia, China, and the United States, has yielded both landmark agreements and diplomatic dead-
ends. The unique six-party multilateral format means that progress is reached only when the five
members attempting to bargain with North Korea agree on an approach to the issue, and impasse
is inevitable when one or more members decides to follow a separate tack.
Indeed, throughout the negotiations, each of the five states dealing with North Korea has
explored a range of strategies: incentives or deterrents often uncoordinated with those of others -
or, as one analyst puts it less optimistically, state actions within the talks have been a "mix of
3 "N. Korea Destroys Nuclear Reactor Tower," CNN, June 27, 2008.
hedging, denial, and avoidance of shared responsibility among North Korea's neighbors."4
This inability to coordinate policy on the North Korea nuclear issue has already taken its
toll: Pyongyang tested an estimated 1 kiloton nuclear device on October 9, 2006 and, depending
on the source and method of calculation, may have reprocessed enough plutonium to possess
between six to twelve additional nuclear weapons.5
Current literature on the six-party talks addresses how the six parties have had trouble
coordinating policies and strategies, but does not provide satisfactory explanation as to why states
or decision-makers within them would come to choose their particular strategies. In addition, the
analytical lenses scholars have employed to examine the six-party talks require further
development, as existing accounts rely too heavily upon realism-based analysis without exploring
other potential explanatory factors. Finally, as many of the studies are confined to two-country
comparisons, they are limited in terms of their ability to provide a thorough analysis of the full
range of factors at play within the six-party process.
All of these leave the larger question unexplained - why five states faced with the same
security threat would choose such a wide range of separate strategies. This study enters the
discourse on the six-party talks with the goal of providing a deeper understanding of why the
process has been repeatedly weakened or brought to an impasse due to lack of strategic alignment
on the part of the five parties negotiating with North Korea.
States (or the decision-makers within them) deal with threats via a range of strategies.
These possible tactics can be measured along an axis moving from strategies of engagement to
those of containment.6 In the case of engagement tactics, we observe states or state actors using
incentives, such as economic aid and concessions. In the case of containment strategies, we
observe states or state actors employing pressure tactics, such as economic sanctions and threats
to use force. Those practicing engagement usually aim to "socialize" the rising power into
accepting the established regional and global order. This may encompass slight adjustments to
the existing order, but without fundamental compromises, and with the goal of avoiding conflict
4 Scott Snyder, "Responses to North Korea's Nuclear Test: Capitulation or Collective Action?" Washington
Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Autumn 2007), pp. 33-43.
5 James Cotton, "North Korea and the Six-party Process: Is a Multilateral Resolution of the Nuclear Issue
Still Possible?" Asian Security, Vol. 3, No. 1, (2007), p. 31; "After the North Korea Nuclear Breakthrough:
Compliance or Confrontation?" International Crisis Group, April 30, 2007; Joel S. Wit, "Enhancing U.S.
Engagement with North Korea," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Spring 2007), pp. 53-66;
Michael J. Mazarr, "The Long Road to Pyongyang; A Case Study in Policymaking without Direction,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 5 (New York, Sept/Oct 2007), pp. 75-93.
6 For details on the following development of this conceptualization, see Randall Schweller, "Managing the
Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory," pp. 15-25.
at all costs. Those practicing containment generally aim not to defeat the rising power but to
stymie it from rising any further, so as to prevent an upset in the global balance of power. In the
case of containment, actors cannot rule out the use of force. Any mixture of both strategies,
falling somewhere along the axis between the two poles, is of course possible, as well.
In order to clearly reveal the strategies taken at the six-party talks, I examine the range of
red lines, green lines, incentives and pressure tactics each set of negotiators, save for the North
Korean team, has brought to the table at each meeting, offering a systematic audit of the tactics
each state has employed over the past five years of negotiations. 7 This process trace of the five
years of talks picks up two types of variance in the strategies of the five players: variance
between states' opinions on the best approach to take at given junctures during the six-party
process, and variance within individual states' tactics over the duration of the talks. The fact that
five states facing the same security threat would employ a range of tactics both individually and
collectively suggests that divergent drivers are at work in each case. With that in mind, I seek to
examine which of three factors - realist concerns, domestic political institutions, and national
identity - holds the most influence over that state's strategic choices within the six-party talks. I
will then trace the origins of the most salient explanatory factor for each state, and conclude with
policy implications of the findings.
My hypothesis consists of two related predictions. First, states within the six-party talks
identified by realist scholars as either the regional economic and military hegemon (the United
States), a great economic power (Japan) or a rising potential great power (China) will largely see
realist concerns manifest in their strategies pursued within the talks, their primary interest being
power maximization linked to security concerns. Second, the countries that for reasons of
economic decline (Russia) or a combination of mid-level economic status and comparatively
small-scale military power (South Korea) are not considered part of the rising great power
equation will reveal strategies less dictated by realist concerns and more within the areas of
domestic political institutions or national identity.8
7 By "green line," I mean a set of actions that a state's negotiators have identified that, should North Korea
complete, result in the awarding of certain incentives. I need to clarify my use of the term "red line." For
the most part, the traditional definition holds - a red line represents a "do not cross" warning to a state
against a particular behavior, with the threat of punishment should the state breach this warning. However,
North Korea has crossed several of these red lines throughout the talks, and while it has been punished for
its actions, the former red line has been replaced with a new one, calling into question the definition of "red
line" if North Korea is clearly able to cross. Therefore, to clarify, I use the concept of a red line to mean a
set of actions the other five parties' negotiators have identified that, should North Korea commit, would
result in a certain set of sanctions or containment tactics designed to "punish" the state, rather than an
'unbreachable' ultimatum.
8 For identification of rising and great powers in the region, as well as "calculation" of a state's power
There are several reasons to select these variables for study. Realism has held pride of
place for several decades in explanations of how states deal with threats; it thus cannot be ignored
as a possible explanation for strategies toward dealing with North Korea's nuclear program. But
if scholars do seek explanations of state behavior separate from those offered by realism, they
often employ either domestic structural factors or identity politics as their lens, or sometimes
combinations of both. Indeed, several scholars have made convincing cases for these two factors
trumping the explanatory power of realist calculations in analyzing state behavior in certain
regions, prime among them Asia, where four of the five countries under study in this paper are
located.9 In addition, when comparing the countries of Asia to one another, these second two
variables display a greater amount of variance than they do in a comparison of European states -
modern state relations in Europe being the model for the realist conception of international
interaction. Specifically, the type and character of domestic political systems vary widely among
each country in Northeast Asia, its nations holding a full range of types of government, from
centralized to decentralized, and from communist to a wide range of democratic systems. Finally,
the historical experience in the Northeast Asian region is necessarily unique from that of Western
Europe: there have been different and non-analogous wars, alliances, and shifts in power
distribution. As a result of these historical differences, individual national identities are
extraordinarily strong in Northeast Asia in a way divergent from the situation found in many
modern Western European states.
Given these reasons for selecting realist concerns, domestic political institutions, and
national identity as my three variables (numbered 1.) to 3.) in the proceeding section), I will
provide a more thorough explanation of what comprises each set of concerns, as well as what we
might expect if one of these variables is driving state strategy regarding the North Korea threat.
1.) As I will employ it in this paper, realism posits the state as unitary, rational actor as its
base unit of analysis in looking at the relations between nations. The international setting is an
arena entirely in a state of nature - anarchy. This anarchic environment is compounded by the
status, see Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security, Vol.
18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79; Aaron Friedburg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar
Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33; John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy
of Great Power Politics (Norton, New York, 2001).
9 See David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," International
Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003); T.J. Pempel, Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004); Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); Thomas U. Berger, Cultures ofAntimilitarism: National
Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
fact that there exists no sovereign to guarantee state survival. States are responsible for their own
security. This places a premium on self-help, resulting in unilateral, competitive, and zero-sum
policies, as states seek at a minimum to survive. The insecurity of this environment renders states
especially concerned with shifts in the relative distribution of power through material - military
and economic - capabilities.'o
Specifically, the structure of the international system compels states to maximize
security. They will do so both in the short term, by responding to rising threats, and in the long
term, by maximizing relative power and capabilities. The former is accomplished through
balancing via alliances with allies that share a common interest in deflecting the threat, and the
latter is effected through a buildup of military and economic might relative to its would-be
challengers."
However, a state takes into account the ability to maximize its security based on its
calculation of which states present the greatest challenge to its relative power; this means that the
state it seeks to balance against may not be the seemingly immediate rising threat but perhaps
another rival deemed more threatening to its interests. In other words, as state interests involve a
calculation of how an outcome might affect a state's relative power, a state's calculation of its
stakes in the outcome of an international negotiation might lead it to attempt to limit the power of
another rival, rather than to restrain or appease the immediate threat.
In addition, because state interests are what we seek to examine, we need to be specific
about what comprises "realist" concerns, as a state's domestic political institutions and national
identity can shape how a state sees its interests. Fearon (1998) provides a useful method for
doing so, breaking realist understandings of state behavior into two categories. 12 In the first
category, the state need only be unitary and rational in its consideration of other states' moves in
its quest for relative power gain. In the second category, the state is not only unitary and rational,
but differences between states other than those immediately linked to the distribution of power
cannot enter into explanations of choice. 13 These differences can encompass state preferences,
10 Johnathan Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring 1995), pp.
229-52; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); Stephen Walt,
The Origins ofAlliances (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1987); Muthaia Alagappa, ed., Asian
Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
1 An alliance under realism is a temporary arrangement formed in response to a shift in power; alliances
and alignments are ways to enhance national power and distribute costs. For elaborations of the definition
of realism I employ, see Kenneth Waltz, Theory ofInternational Politics; Stephen Walt, The Origins of
Alliances.
12 Fearon, James D. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations." Annual
Review of Political Science 1 (1998): 289-313.
13 See Kenneth Waltz, Theory ofInternational Politics for details of this variant.
regime types, a state's political culture, whether the state is a democracy, or whether the same
party controls both the executive and the legislature in a presidential system - any unit-level
attributes of particular states outside of relative power. I will employ this latter category in my
definition of realist concerns.
If realism is a primary factor in determining state choices, we should observe strategies at
the six-party talks based on each state's desire to maximize security or power based on its
calculation of interests. Thus, one can have multiple "realist" explanations based on how each
views the stakes: in the case of the six-party talks, accomplishing DPRK denuclearization must be
weighed against what it would mean in terms of increased U.S. influence in the region, should the
negotiations be dominated by U.S. preferences. Therefore, we might see the North Korea threat
figure less heavily into a given state's realist calculus, given other structural concerns.
There are several predictions regarding specific actions we might observe. First, because
of their concerns with the relative balance of power, states will balance against a rising military
threat, not offer appeasement; the greater the immediate threat, the stronger the reaction. This
will include both external balancing (alliances) and internal balancing (military and economic
buildup). The greater the state's offensive capabilities, the more likely others will align against it,
and the nearer a powerful state, the greater the tendency for those nearby to align against it.14
Again, a state may not include the newly rising threat in its calculus if it deems another regional
state a threat to its place in the relative balance of power. In other words, two states can have
different interests on the peninsula because of how the outcome might affect a state's relative
power.
Second, states will be concerned about relative economic gains by the rising state; as
such, states will limit their economic engagement with threatening states. Again, we could also
see the six-party format used by a state to block the economic gains of another power in the
region, if the state deems the threat or relative gain held by the other power greater than that held
by North Korea.
Conversely, if states are not in fact unitary actors as dictated by a realist understanding of
state action, then internal elements necessarily enter into a state's decision-making process - the
so-called second-image approach. In moving to explain my two domestically-derived variables, I
borrow two questions from Fearon (1998) that outline such an investigation. First, how important
are domestic factors, relative to systemic or structural factors, in the explanation of state choice?
14 Stephen Walt, The Origins ofAlliances.
And second, how, exactly, do domestic factors shape state choice?1 5 We can again return to the
two categories of realist understandings of state behavior. In the first category, in which the state
need only be unitary and rational in its quest for relative power gain, a non-realist, domestic
variable-derived explanation of state action would envision a non-unitary state pursuing a
"suboptimal" foreign policy due to the interactions of actors within the state. In the second
category, in which the state is not only unitary and rational but any other state differences outside
of those linked to power distribution are excluded from explaining behavior, the set of domestic
variable-derived explanations also allows for arguments in which states' characteristics other than
power help explain their foreign policy choices, or in which domestic factors give rise to diverse
state choices.16 Because I have chosen the latter definition of realism, my domestically oriented
variables follow suit with the latter operationalization. That is, we will see choices states make
when not taking into account realist concerns as 'suboptimal' ones given the security or power
situation; they will also be choices unexplained by a state's drive to maintain relative power, and
better explained by domestic factors. Given this explanation of what we might see if state foreign
policy choices are driven by domestic factors, I will now specify the two domestically-derived
variables in my study: domestic political institutions and national identity.
2.) Domestic political institutions as I define them can drive state decisions through two
components, both related to "domestic structure:" first, the structure of state organization; and
second, the structure of state-society relations.17 The first involves competing political parties
and policymaking bodies bringing pressures to bear on any state decision; the second
encompasses the ways that interaction between the state and society - the media, interest groups,
the electorate, and the general public - is able to influence policy decisions. While domestic
actors are indeed influenced by ideational factors such as norms, I focus here upon the
overarching structure of the domestic political realm in order to distinguish this variable from the
more ideational aspects of identity. In short, I am asking: What about the domestic structural
setup itself could affect policy choice?
In terms of the first factor, state structures can strengthen the ability of officials to carry
out policies either in their own interests or in their particular interpretation of the national
15 Fearon, James D. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations."
16 A "suboptimal" choice or outcome is in reference to the foreign policy the principal would ideally desire
in cases where a principal-agent analysis applies, and in other cases by reference to what the chief decision
maker would likely prefer if intervening domestic factors were not a constraint to foreign policy choice.
17 For elaboration, see Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, 34-35.
interest.18 They can also produce situations in which policy decisions are the result of a power
struggle between competing policymaking bodies. In terms of the second factor, the way in
which state-society relations manifest themselves can serve to insulate state bodies and decision-
makers from society - or make them vulnerable to public opinion. These patterns of inclusion
and exclusion of certain groups in the policymaking process can be institutionalized in state
structures over time. 19
A domestic political approach assumes there are many policy choices having little to do
with the sole pursuit of relative power or security. Thus, if domestic politics are a determinant of
six-party strategy-making, then we should expect to observe distinct patterns in which a state
changes its strategy more slowly or 'less optimally' than we would expect given surrounding
objective, empirical factors such as shifts in the DPRK security threat. Instead, we will observe
these decisions made along lines dictated by actors within the state's domestic political landscape
- such as a political party's drive to maintain popularity or the playing out of a unique set of
state-society relations. 20
3.) A second way that internal drivers can affect strategic choice is through a given state's
national identity. This ideational factor can be defined as "socially shared understandings of how
the world is and should be," providing a cognitive framework for shaping interests, preferences,
worldview, and foreign policy actions. 21 This framework in turn establishes a hierarchy among
the political, sociocultural, and economic beliefs of the state, ordering the positions and worth of
individuals and groups within that society, which includes extending legitimacy to social actions
and movements.22 National identity also distinguishes the state in question from the rest of the
international community, which in turn informs its international orientation and its definition of
national interest. All of these elements are potentially manifest in the processes of policymaking
18 William W. Grimes, "Institutionalized Inertia: Japanese Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era," in G.
John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, eds., International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2003), p. 358.
19 William W. Grimes, "Institutionalized Inertia: Japanese Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era," p.
359.
20 William W. Grimes, "Institutionalized Inertia: Japanese Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era," pp.
360; Helen Milner, Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Ikenberry, Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities
ofAmerican Government (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); Henning, Currencies and Politics
in the United States, Germany, and Japan (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1994).
21 Thomas U. Berger, International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2003).
22 Muthiah Alagappa, "Rethinking Security," in Alagappa, ed. Asian Security Practice: Material and
Ideational Influences, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 36.
and policy implementation.23
However, "national identity" constitutes an extremely broad category. In order to hone it
into a specific driver for investigation, I wish to focus on two sets of influences of national
identity that are most salient when looking at issues regarding security; one set of influences
being normative in origin, and the other historical. I wish to examine what norms exist regarding
the use of force as a valid tool of statecraft, and I wish to look at a state's historical experience in
world and regional affairs, for this provides the basis for a set of beliefs held by citizens and
policymakers alike about what characterizes the state - and thus indicate what position it should
seek or maintain within the established order, especially when it comes to issues of security.24
Like other sets of societal norms, norms act as collective expectations, dictating preferred
sets of behavior for actors. Studies examining normative elements within a given culture often
divide norms into two general ways of operation: as rules defining actor identity (thus holding
constitutive effects), and as standards specifying enactment of an already defined identity
(holding regulatory effects). Norms regarding the use of force can fall into both categories, but it
is the first category upon which I focus, as constitutive norms foster group identification and are
at the root of social coordination, helping define a nation's identity for actors within it.25
The second component comprising national identity, collective memory of the past, is
central in identity formation, for external historical experiences and national ones, such as
politically defining moments like national liberation and dramatic political change, can have
lasting impact on state identity, interests, and behavior.26 In addition, a state's understanding of
the international system is often rooted in its interpretation of history.2 7 Thus, examining a state's
historical experience is a way to identify manifestation of a unique collective identity.
Similar to domestic political structures, collective identities can compel actors to make
choices that, from a rationalist perspective, are costly and/or serve no purpose. 28 Thus, if national
identity is a primary factor behind a state's choice of strategy at the six-party talks, we should see
a state or decision-makers within that state making choices that seem incongruous or poor given
surrounding objective, empirical factors linked to power or security. Instead, we would see a
state react via established guidelines constituting national identity - such as, for example, a
23 Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, pp. 31.
24 Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, p. 5; Samuel S. Kim, China and the World
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994) pp. 10-13.
25 Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, p. 5.26 Muthiah Alagappa, "Rethinking Security," p. 21.
27 Thomas U. Berger, International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific.
28 Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, p. 27.
culturally unique set of norms about whether or not using force is valid, a distinct form of
nationalism, or notions about where the state should position itself in the global order that are
based on a particular historical experience. This last factor can sometimes align with realist
calculations, if identity factors drive the state in question to pursue a position of relative power
and wealth in the global order.
This study finds that United States negotiators have brought to the six-party talks a mixed
strategy leaning more toward containment, and one indeed stemming primarily from realist
concerns related to the North Korea threat. It finds that South Korean negotiators' strategy of
engagement at the six-party talks is fueled by issues of national identity and domestic political
institutions rather than by realist calculations. However, while Chinese negotiators seem to
follow a realist line of thinking at the six-party talks, so, too, do the Russian negotiators. In
addition, in both cases, the states' six-party strategies lean toward engagement rather than
containment of North Korea; instead, both states seem to be balancing against U.S. interests in the
region. Finally, the study finds that in the case of Japan, instead of forming strategy at the six-
party talks primarily through a realist lens, sees the domestic institutional setup come into play,
encouraging policymakers and politicians to bring the non-security-related concern of North
Korea's kidnapping of Japanese citizens into its six-party negotiation strategy. Additionally,
national identity, in terms of Japan's resurgent nationalism, also factors in its citizens' and
policymakers' strong reactions to the kidnapping issue.
In tracing the origins of the primary drivers behind these strategies, this study finds that
China's realist drive stems largely from its particular vision of economic and geopolitical growth;
Japan's drive for a resolution to the kidnapping issue stems from jockeying for domestic political
popularity as well as a rapid reconfiguring of its perception of North Korea; Russia's realist drive
derives from the Putin-led push to regain a semblance of its historical sphere of influence; South
Korea's focus on peninsular engagement comes from a renewed nationalism, its legacy as a
"divided nation," and a post-democratization reimagining of national identity in terms of the
North Korea threat; and the United States' concentration on realist factors is derived from unique
aspects of the post-September 11, 2001 security environment as well as increased regional
competition with China.
These findings hold several implications for policy. First, the United States needs to craft
policy that takes into account the fact that its two main bilateral alliance partners in Northeast
Asia - Japan and South Korea - are not necessarily looking at events in Northeast Asia through
an exclusively or even primarily realist lens. Second, regional realist concerns do not necessarily
encompass perception of a nuclear North Korea as a threat per se, nor as the top strategic priority.
In addition, the strategies of states employing a primarily realist framework may lie more heavily
in balancing against U.S. regional hegemony than in acquiescing with its decision-making on
matters of regional security. Finally, the North Korea nuclear crisis - or, indeed, any issue
involving North Korea - cannot be solved without not only taking into domestic political and
national identity concerns, as well as China's new regional role as rising power.
I divide this paper into five main sections. I first go over my research design in more
detail. Next, I summarize the history of the meetings themselves, in order to effectively analyze
what existing approaches bring toward understanding the six-party talks. From this, I ascertain
what scholars have and have not addressed in terms of the question of six-party strategies and
their drivers. In the second section, I look at the range of concerns, red lines and green lines, and
incentives and pressure tactics China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea, and the United States
bring to the table, and from this delineate the range of strategies each state employs. Based on the
above predictions for how each variable might drive policymaking decisions, I determine which
of the three factors - realist interests, domestic institutions, and national identity - holds the most
influence over that state's strategy at the six-party talks, offering an explanation of the origins of
the variable found to be the primary driver for each party. In the final section, I look at what
these findings imply in terms of crafting strategy toward dealing with the North Korean nuclear
threat.
II. Research Design
The dearth in coordination between the six-party players renders existing gaps in the
literature particularly glaring. Analysts have provided some insight into what particular strategies
the five players in question have brought to the six-party negotiations, but have not systematically
looked at how and from where these strategies originated.
I seek to examine the range of what offers a given state's negotiators have brought to the
negotiating table as a systematic method to outline strategy. I look at the range of concerns, red
lines and green lines, and incentives and pressure tactics that China, Japan, Russia, and South
Korea, and the United States have brought to the table, and from this delineate the range of
strategies each state has employed. To codify each country's strategy or range of strategies, I use
the axis of state reaction to a threat ranging from engagement to containment as described in this
paper's introduction.
In the next section of the paper, I determine which of three factors - realist interests,
domestic institutions, and national identity - holds the most influence over that state's strategy at
the six-party talks. I accomplish this by examining the range of strategies brought to the talks
and, using the predictive models I have mapped out in the introduction for my three variables,
identify the variable or variables that best explain the strategic choices of that country's
policymakers during the six-party process. I follow this with a more detailed explanation of the
origins of the variable found to be the primary driver for each party. In the final section, I look at
what my findings imply in terms of crafting strategy toward dealing with the North Korean
nuclear threat.
Three explanatory caveats are necessary. First, this study will not take up an analysis of
the North Korean position for two reasons. The first is the unfortunate fact of working on any
North Korean issue: the DPRK's extremely closed nature means any attempt to understand of its
internal situation, drivers, and preferences beyond regime survival will be limited at best.
Second, the purpose of this study is to examine the reasons for which the five countries
attempting to offer a deal to North Korea have or have not come to a consensus; in this case, then,
North Korean preferences and the drivers behind them need not be identified.
The second explanatory caveat is that there may be a certain amount of overlap in the
variables' explanatory power for a certain preference, or the three variables may not fully explain
certain strategic preferences. This study seeks to find the best possible explanatory match for the
observed state preferences.
Finally, when looking into which variables best explain negotiation strategy at the six-party
talks, our interest should not be in debating whether domestic or systemic factors are more
important overall to understanding these choices. Rather, we should focus our effort on spelling
out what foreign policy choices and results are predicted to occur given certain state assumptions.
1. Methodology
a. Hypothesis and Variables
My hypothesis consists of two related predictions. First, states within the six-party talks
identified by realist scholars as either the regional economic and military hegemon (the United
States), a great economic power (Japan) or a rising potential great power (China) will largely see
realist concerns manifest in their strategies pursued within the talks, their primary interest being
power maximization linked to security concerns. Second, the countries that for reasons of
economic decline (Russia) or a combination of mid-level economic status and comparatively
small-scale military power (South Korea) are not considered part of the rising great power
equation will reveal strategies less dictated by realist concerns and more within the areas of
domestic political institutions or national identity.
(My null hypothesis is that a realist-based understanding of dynamics within the six-
party talks - that is, the strategies of powerful states can be explained fully by realist thinking,
and that the strategies of less powerful states are primarily driven not by realist concerns but by
factors related domestic institutions or national identity - is false, and that alternate explanations
are necessary on some or all counts.)
My independent variables are realist thought, domestic political institutions, and national
identity. My dependent variable is a state's strategy at the six-party talks.
b. Case Selection and Research Aims
The six-party format is ideal in examining if, why, and how individual state strategies
and/or domestic concerns are brought into the international policymaking process, as it requires
Russia, China, the United States, South Korea and Japan to compromise upon such strategies and
agree upon a mutual approach to dealing with North Korea in order for the security architecture to
function in a full and effective manner. This is because any approach - be it diplomatic or
military, incentives or sanctions - requires the acquiescence and material and/or economic
support of the five parties.
My main empirical research aim is to perform a process trace on the approaches toward
the North Korea nuclear issue taken by the states within the six-party format. Because my
research question and hypotheses involve observed phenomena in specific states, the
requirements related to case selection for controlled comparison do not apply. Therefore, this
project's findings will not have general predictive power, but rather explanatory power in the case
of the five countries under study.29
29 For further detail, see Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in
the Social Sciences (Cambridge: BCSIA, 2004) and Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of
Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).
c. Sources
My research involved both primary and secondary sources from each country under
study. This included current academic literature on the topic, along with reports by non-
governmental organizations and research institutions such as the International Crisis Group, the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Congressional Research Service, the
Department of Defense, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and the Defense Intelligence
Agency. Where available, I employed the use of the equivalents of these organizations in the
other nations under study. This also includes such primary-source materials as newspaper articles
and published surveys. Other readily available primary sources related to security policy
included national security strategies, diplomatic bluebooks, and defense white papers. I
undertook some research in Korean; however, nearly all of the primary sources required for the
five countries under study were available in English.
2. Contributions
This study will contribute to explaining a significant contemporary policy and security
issue that is as of this writing still unresolved. In addition, it will address the lack in the current
literature of a systematic audit of state strategies, as well as to help build a more comprehensive
approach to explaining the process through which the five parties craft strategy on DPRK security
issues. In turn, the findings will have applications to the study of policymaking in these countries
on other security issues, as well as help to suggest further avenues for research, both theoretical
and empirical.
Understanding the dynamics behind the strategic choices China, Japan, Russia, South
Korea, and the United States have made during the six-party talks will provide greater insight into
what is required to build an effective multilateral security regime in East Asia. It will also
contribute to the evaluation of the six-party format as a diplomatic device - many see the six-
party talks as an ineffective format, still sputtering forward after over half a decade, no clear end
in sight; does what we see allow us to be optimistic about the proceedings, or should the nations
involve seek changes to the format or a different architecture altogether? From this, we can more
effectively weigh proposals to turn the six-party talks into a permanent regional multilateral
framework.
Next, I will provide an overview of the events and concerns seen throughout the six-party
process. I do so in order to delineate the major issues at stake for each player as well as to
pinpoint the major successes and failures of strategy coordination between China, Japan, Russia,
South Korea, and the United States. This will in turn help to understand which factors the
existing literature on the six-party talks has adequately addressed, and where it is lacking.
III. The Six-party Talks: A Brief History
Analysts disagree over whether the U.S. or North Korea bears primary responsibility for
the rupture of the 1994 Agreed Framework, which spiraled into the second North Korean nuclear
crisis.30 The crisis clearly surfaced, however, with Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly's
revelation on October 16, 2002 that North Korean officials had revealed Pyongyang's program to
develop highly-enriched uranium. With this news, the United States halted heavy oil shipments
under the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO, formed under the Agreed
Framework). North Korea responded the next month by beginning a series of steps at the
Yongbyon nuclear facilities that included removing all seals put in place under the Agreed
Framework, dismantling International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring cameras, and
expelling IAEA inspectors. On January 10, 2003, Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from the
nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). In the weeks that followed, evidence surfaced of the
North's tampering with stored fuel rods, restarting its experimental reactor at Yongbyon, and
resuming missile tests.31
Officials within China's Foreign Ministry proposed talks with North Korean and U.S.
negotiators, and Kelly insisted that the United States would not enter into any bilateral
discussions with Pyongyang, which is what the North desired.32 Given the U.S. stance on
bilateral meetings, representatives from the three countries met briefly in Beijing in mid-April,
but came to no conclusion on the issue of DPRK's nuclear weapons program. At this meeting,
North Korean negotiators claimed their country already possessed two nuclear weapons and was
reprocessing spent fuel, threatened to physically demonstrate these capabilities, and implied
30 Leon Sigal, "Misplaying North Korea and Losing Friends and Influence in Northeast Asia," Social
Science Research Council, July 12, 2005; Victor Cha and David C. Kang, "The Debate over North Korea,"
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 2, 2004, pp. 229-254.
31 "Reactor Started in North Korea, U.S. Concludes," New York Times, February 27, 2003.
32 James Kelly, Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington D.C., March 12, 2003
(http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2003/18661.htm).
Pyongyang's possible intent to export such weapons. 33 Foreign Ministry officials in Beijing
began working behind the scenes to bring the U.S., China, and Japan to the table for a round of
four-party talks on the issue. U.S. officials insisted on adding South Korea to the roster at the
behest of officials in Seoul, who had felt left out of the negotiations for KEDO, especially as they
had footed much of the by-then sunk costs; in turn, North Korea insisted on Russia's inclusion.34
That August, the six-party process began.
At the first round of six-party talks, held between August 27 and 29, 2003, North Korean
negotiators pressed for a step-by-step dismantlement process, which would include a formal
security guarantee, but U.S. negotiators and President George W. Bush balked, continuing to
insist on complete, verified, irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of the North's nuclear
programs. 35 In addition, though North Korean negotiators urged the U.S. to hold bilateral
meetings, which the Chinese negotiators encouraged, U.S. negotiators refused to do so, insisting
on a fully multilateral format to reach a solution.36 With these impasses, the Chinese delegation
tried to keep things moving by patching together a six-point "memorandum of understanding," in
which the six parties agreed to resolve the nuclear issue through peaceful means and dialogue, to
take into account the DPRK's security concerns, to explore a plan to resolving the nuclear issue
in a simultaneous, incremental manner, to avoid inflammatory words or actions, and to continue
the six-partty dialogue. 37 However, aside from this memorandum, the parties issued no formal
agreement at this round.
At the second round of six-party talks, held February 25 to 28, 2004, the parties agreed to
form a working group on the issue, with the goal of meeting more frequently than the schedule of
the formal talks allowed. However, the North Korean negotiators continued to insist on a step-
by-step process with a formal security guarantee, and the U.S. side continued to rebuff their
requests, insisting on CVID. The remaining negotiating parties did not endorse the CVID
proposal, choosing to postpone hashing out a consensus on how the dismantlement process would
unfold. China, the ROK and Russia pledged to provide energy assistance to the DPRK on certain
conditions, whereas the U.S. and Japan only "recognized" North Korea's energy needs without
any promise of provision. Without an agreement between the six teams, the Chinese delegation
33 "North Korea Says It now Possess Nuclear Arsenal," New York Times, April 25, 2003.
34 Gilbert Rozman, Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis (New York: Palgrave, 2007), p.
193.
35 "North Korea: Where Next for the Nuclear Talks?"
3 6 Ibid.
37 "Vice FM Wang Yi, Head of Chinese Delegation to the Six-party Talks, Gives a Press Conference,"
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, August 30, 2003.
again drafted and issued a joint statement that essentially reiterated the six-point statement of the
last round and continued its positive assessment of the progress of the talks.38
During the third round of six-party talks, held June 23 to 26, 2004, both the U.S. and
South Korean delegations brought detailed proposals on denuclearization to the table. The U.S.
proposal divided the process into two parts and still largely followed the CVID model, with aid
offered further along in the proceedings, whereas the South Korean proposal was more flexible
regarding reciprocity and front-loading incentives prior to DPRK actions.39 The parties agreed to
employ a step-by-step solution according to a principal vaguely stated as "words for words and
action for action."" Again, the parties did not come to any formal agreements; the Chinese
delegation again released a Chairman's Statement similar to the one in the prior round.
The fourth round of six-party talks unfolded in two phases, broken up by that year's
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) forum meetings. The first phase of this round,
held July 27 to August 6, 2005, came on the heels of the February announcement by the North
Korean foreign ministry that the DPRK indeed possessed nuclear weapons and would increase its
arsenal in response to U.S. hostility.4 1 At the talks, the U.S. negotiating team finally agreed to the
repeated requests at the last three rounds by the North Korean and Chinese teams that the U.S.
team hold bilateral discussions with its DPRK counterparts. However, the talks hit a major snag
when the U.S. team refused to accept a light-water reactor energy program in North Korea, even
as the other four negotiating parties agreed in principle. U.S. negotiators eventually acquiesced to
a compromise in which they would consider such a proposal following the North's
accomplishment of CVID, rejoining of the NPT, and restoration of IAEA safeguards.42
At the second phase of the fourth round, held September 13 to 19, 2005, the parties
agreed upon a Joint Statement that reaffirmed much of the language of the previous closing
statements, with two important additions. First, the U.S. side agreed it would provide a formal
security guarantee to North Korea. Second, all parties agreed to discuss the light-water reactor
program for the DPRK "at an appropriate time." 43 It seemed that U.S. negotiators had moved to a
38 "Three Features and Five Advancements," Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, February
28, 2004.
39 James Kelly "Dealing With North Korea's Nuclear Programs," July 15, 2004
(http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/34395.htm); "North Korea: Where Next for the Nuclear Talks?"
40 "New Consensus and New Steps," Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 26, 2004.
41 "DPRK FM on Its Stand to Suspend Its Participation in Six-party Talks for Indefinite Period," Korean
Central News Agency, February 10, 2005.
42 "After North Korea's Missile Launch: Are the Nuclear Talks Dead?" International Crisis Group, August
9, 2006.
43 "Full Text of Six-party Talks Joint Statement," September 19, 2005
(http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-09/19/content_479150.htm).
compromise with the other five parties on the peaceful nuclear energy issue; however, in his
closing statement, chief U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill made it clear that an "appropriate time"
was indeed following CVID, and also announced it was formally ending KEDO, the previous,
suspended light-water reactor program in North Korea.44 At the same time this round of talks
unfolded, the U.S. Treasury Department threatened sanctions on a Macao bank dealing in
suspicious North Korean funds, resulting in the bank's freezing the money.45
The fifth round of talks unfolded in three phases. The first, from November 9 to 11,
2005, produced nothing substantive, with chief North Korean negotiator Kim Gye-gwan telling
Hill that the U.S. sanctions were of hostile intent, and both sides unwilling to move any further on
other issues.46 Chinese delegates once again drafted a Chairman's Statement, though noticeably
thin and with no new additions.47 This round was cut short by that year's Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) meetings.
The second phase of the fifth round, held December 18-22, 2006, was more than a year in
coming, with North Korean officials refusing to return to the table due to the U.S. sanctions on
the DPRK's funds in Macao, during which time the North conducted tests of a salvo of missiles
as well as a nuclear device. This phase was largely devoted to bilateral discussions regarding the
frozen North Korean accounts. The talks went into "recess" due to a lack of consensus on the
sanctions issue.48
The third phase of the fifth round, held February 8-13, 2007, yielded a Joint Statement
known in the media as the February 13 Agreement. Under it, North Korea is committed to
shutting down and sealing its facilities at Yongbyon and submitting them to IAEA inspection.
The DPRK also must declare its remaining nuclear programs and establish working groups on
denuclearization, energy resources, and regional security, as well as initiate working groups and
bilateral talks on DPRK-U.S. and DPRK-Japan normalization. In turn, the United States will
begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism and
terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK.
The North agreed to complete all of the above requirements within 60 days of the
declaration in exchange for 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil or its equivalent. Following
44 Christopher Hill, "Closing Plenary of the Fourth Round of the Six-party Talks, U.S. Department of
State, September 18, 2005 (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53499.htm).
45 Dianne E. Rennack, "North Korea: Economic Sanctions," CRS Report for Congress, October 17, 2006.
46 "After North Korea's Missile Launch: Are the Nuclear Talks Dead?"
47 "Full Text of Chairman's Statement," Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 22, 2006.
48 "DPRK, U.S. meet on nuke, financial issues as six-party talks enter 2nd day," Xinhua, December 20,
2006; "6-party talks could start as early as this month: sources," Hankyoreh Sinmun, January 10, 2007.
Pyongyang's complete declaration of its nuclear programs and disablement of all existing nuclear
facilities, including the graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing plants, the other parties will
provide an additional 950,000 tons of heavy fuel oil or its equivalent.49
Noticeably, the agreement makes no provision for the North's requested peaceful nuclear
program. In addition, Japan and the United States disagree with the tenets of the agreement, even
as they both signed it. Japan declared it would not contribute to provision of the fuel aid until the
issue of its citizens abducted by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s was resolved. The United
States responded that it was still adamant on CVID and would not provide aid, either, until North
Korea accomplished full denuclearization. 50
The sixth round, ongoing as of this writing, has so far consisted of two phases. The first
part of the first phase, held March 19 to 22, 2007, was marked by Assistant Secretary Hill's
announcement that all of the frozen funds were released. However, North Korean negotiators
boycotted the meetings after the first day because the funds were not readily available due to the
Bank of China's reluctance to touch money from the bank, which the U.S. Treasury Department
still had on its blacklist. 51 The remaining parties were forced to call a recess.
The second part of the first phase, held July 18 to 20, 2007, saw the North Korean
delegation return to the negotiating table after a Russian bank agreed in June to transfer the now-
unfrozen but still contested North Korean funds from Macao to a North Korean bank.52 In
addition, the day the talks began, IAEA inspectors verified that North Korea had indeed closed its
Yongbyon facilities per the February 13 agreement. 53 The parties issued a Joint Statement that
delineated steps toward fulfilling the February 13, 2007 agreement.5 4 Japan continued its refusal
to provide energy aid until the abductions issue is resolved, and the U.S. continued its refusal to
provide energy aid until North Korea accomplished U.S. requirements for CVID.
The second phase of the sixth round, held September 27 to 30, 2007, produced a list of
second-phase actions toward completing the February 13, 2007 agreement, including
normalization efforts promised by U.S. negotiators, such as removing the U.S. State Department
designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism and ceasing application of the Trading
49 "Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement," Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
February 13, 2007.
50 "South Korea and Japan Split on North Korea Pact," The New York Times, February 15, 2007.51 "6-party talks on North Korea are stalled," International Herald-Tribune, March 20, 2007.52 "Russia Agrees To Help North Korea Banking Row," Agence France-Presse, June 11, 2007.
53 "U.N. verifies closure of North Korean nuclear facilities," CNN, July 18, 2007.
54 "Press Communique of the Six-party Talks," July 7, 2007 (http://www.chinadaily.net/world/2007-
07/20/content_5440408.htm).
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with the Enemy Act on North Korean accounts and companies.55
As of this writing, the talks continue, though with no new round officially scheduled and
with U.S. and DPRK policymakers continuing their debate over the pace and scope of North
Korea's obligations.
The following chart summarizes major coordination successes and impasses throughout
the talks.
Tracking Coordination during the Six-party Process:
55 "Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan Web site, October 3, 2007 (http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/nkorea/6party/actionO710.html).
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As the divergence in issues and strategy within the negotiations suggest, coordination
among the five parties has been a scarce commodity. While the six-party process is not based on
negotiators taking a wholly unified approach at all times, it is clear from the above summary of
events that negotiators' failure to agree on certain principles and strategies has been behind the
major stalemates and breakdowns in discussion.
In order to understand these differences, I first look at what scholars have had to say
about the drivers of strategy toward the North Korea nuclear issue at the six-party talks. As the
next section tells us, existing studies do not adequately explain why these countries have come to
endorse these divergent strategies.
IV. Literature Review
Literature on the six-party talks adequately identifies the disagreements between
negotiating teams throughout the process, but still leaves several major stones unturned - namely,
what is driving the strategy of certain states and the officials within them. This shortcoming is
related to two factors: first, the analytical lenses scholars have employed are largely limited to
realist ones; second, most studies compare only the approaches of two given countries, offering
an incomplete picture of the myriad dynamics at hand.
The largest group of literature focuses on which policies the parties should attempt to
implement at the talks. Nearly all of these debates focus solely on what the best strategy would
be for U.S. negotiators, ignoring the need to coordinate strategy among the other four parties.56
This singular focus on what Washington should be doing too readily takes the primacy of the U.S.
strategy as a given. This fails to address the fact that the multilateral format requires consensus
on strategy among the five states negotiating with North Korea, in order to effectively move the
discussion along and find coordination, whether the agreed strategy encompasses pressure or
engagement.5
What all scholars pay scant attention to is the 'why' - why negotiations at the talks have
been marked by repeated lack of coordination. Studies that take a comparative approach move
more in this direction and offer more depth in their scope of analysis. These studies examine the
strategies chosen by two or more states within the six-party group and compare these tactics with
one another, in order to ascertain what is driving decision-making.
Within this group of studies, Kang (2005) compares the approaches of the United States
56 See, for example, Joel S. Wit, "Enhancing U.S. Engagement with North Korea"; Michael Horowitz,
"Who's Behind That Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage over Pyongyang," The Washington Quarterly,
Vol. 28, No. 1, Winter 2004; Mitchell Reiss, "A Nuclear-armed North Korea: Accepting the
'Unacceptable?' " Survival, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Winter 2006/07), pp. 97-110; Cha and Kang, Nuclear North
Korea; Victor Cha and David C. Kang, "The Debate over North Korea," pp. 235-38; Victor Cha and David
Kang, "Can North Korea Be Engaged?" Survival, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Summer 2004), pp. 89-108, Victor Cha,
"Winning Asia: Washington's Untold Success Story," Foreign Affairs (November/December 2007).
57 Several scholars do take into account the deleterious effects of this frequent lack of coordination. Schoff
(2006) sees the six-party players as having not enough clarity on application of incentives or removal of
disincentives, thus stymieing efforts to come to a solution. Rozman (2007) acknowledges that South
Koreas refusal to offer anything but incentives to the North means that there exist no multilateral red lines
at the six-party proceedings. See James L. Schoff, "Political Fences and Bad Neighbors: North Korea
Policymaking in Japan and Implications for the United States" (Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy
Analysis, June 2006); Gilbert Rozman, "Turning the Six-party Talks into a Multilateral Security
Framework for Northeast Asia," in Towards Sustainable Economic and Security Relation in East Asia: U.S.
and ROK Policy Options (Washington: Korea Economic Institute, 2007).
and Japan.58 He warns that Washington risks confusing Tokyo's embrace of sanctions as a sign
of their commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance and not what the sanctions are truly linked to: a
drive to resolve the kidnapping issue. Tokyo's policies toward the DPRK have sought to avoid
binding Japan to follow the U.S. position, while domestic politics have forced the abduction issue
to the fore, Kang writes. Once that issue is resolved, he concludes, Japan will be far less likely to
pressure North Korea and may return to its original engagement policy. Yet Kang does not delve
into why Japan might allow domestic factors to come to bear on its six-party strategy, nor why it
had at first practiced an engagement policy with the North under Koizumi despite increased
threats, shifting suddenly to a hard-line tack when it pushed the kidnapping issue to the fore. In
addition, by limiting his comparison to only two countries, Kang narrows his scope of analysis.
Several scholars provide a comparison between the tactics Chinese and U.S. negotiators
have brought to the six-party negotiating table. Most are content to examine China's actions at
the talks through a realist lens. Kim (2006) writes that the United States mistakenly assumed
China's goal at the talks to also be preventing a nuclear North, when in fact stability on the
peninsula and in the region are its primary concerns. 59 Snyder and Wit (2007) reaffirm Kim's
claim that China primarily seeks not North Korean denuclearization but rather maintenance of
stability on its periphery, as well as to maintain influence and ability to shape events on the
peninsula in ways favorable to Beijing's strategic interests, which may bring Beijing into conflict
with Washington. 60 Wu (2005) writes that due to security concerns stemming from the North
Korea issue - namely, the fear of refugees or regional military conflict - the "lips and teeth"
relationship between North Korea and China is "both obsolete and self-destructive" to the latter.61
Moore (2008) looks at the China-U.S. comparison through the contradiction between China's
willingness to sanction North Korea for its nuclear activity and Beijing's continued aid flow to
Pyongyang, concluding that China sees this "two-pronged policy" as the best way to retain
regional stability and keep North Korea from threatening China's economic and security
interests.62
Where touched upon, ideational factors, such as ideological considerations or historical
58 David C. Kang, "Japan: U.S. Partner or Focused on Abductees?" The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28,
No. 4, Autumn 2005, pp. 107-117.
59 Samuel S. Kim, The Two Koreas and the Great Powers (New York: Cambridge, 2006).
60 Snyder and Wit, "Chinese Views: Breaking the Stalemate on the Korean Peninsula" (Washington: United
States Institute of Peace, February 2007).
61 Anne Wu, "What China Whispers to North Korea," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2, Spring
2005.
62 Gregory J. Moore, "How North Korea Threatens China's Interests: Understanding Chinese 'Duplicity'
on the North Korean Nuclear Issue," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2008), pp.
1-29.
legacy, are quickly dismissed as epiphenomenal. Wu finds China has altered its diplomatic
philosophy greatly since the Korean War, and in recent years has been orienting its foreign policy
to serve domestic priorities. Moore writes that any ideological ties between the two nations have
been replaced by a drive for regional economic integration on Beijing's part, and that Beijing has
not trusted North Korea for decades. He concludes that The United States thus risks
overestimating China's ties to and interest in North Korea outside of its own strategic
calculations.
In contrast to these prior China-U.S. studies, Glaser and Liang (2008) look beyond
realism, comparing Chinese and U.S. strategy.63 They write that China was initially reluctant to
get involved in any negotiations on the North Korea nuclear issue, preferring to let Washington
and Pyongyang hash it out. This reluctance, according to the authors, stemmed not only from
uncertainty as to the verity of Washington's accusations toward the North, but also from the fact
that China's assuming an active diplomatic role would be counter to the enduring guideline of
Deng Xiaoping to assume a low profile in the international arena.
In general, however, the analyses of Chinese strategy rely too heavily upon a strictly
realist lens, without exploring other potential explanatory factors. In addition, these analyses, by
being self-limited to comparisons of Chinese and U.S. strategy, ensure their analytical scope is
narrow, as in the previously discussed United States-Japan comparisons.
Two studies by Snyder (2005, 2006), while engaging a range of conceptual approaches,
suffer from the same narrow scope. 64 The two studies provide a similar comparison of U.S. and
South Korean strategies at the talks. Snyder sees Seoul trapped between a zero-sum alliance with
the Washington and the desire to play a role in policy toward Pyongyang, a desire that has led
South Korean policymakers to choose engagement and economic aid with the DPRK, seeing the
United States as a "distracted superpower ally with differing global priorities." He argues that
South Korean citizens and policymakers fear entrapment in a military conflict precipitated by
U.S. unwillingness to be flexible toward North Korea. Additionally, South Koreans see the
North's threat as deriving from its weakness, not its material capabilities; therefore, Seoul is
reluctant to move from economic cooperation because it sees economic ties as an insurance
clause against North Korean collapse.
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Snyder also posits that contradictions between the national security strategy of the United
States and South Korea, respectively, have spilled over into the six-party talks, where it has been
difficult to coordinate tactical approaches between the United States and the ROK. According to
Snyder, the United States is trying to shut out any peer competitors in the region, whereas South
Korea seeks the right institutional frameworks and structures to lead to economic growth for the
region. Snyder identifies two seemingly contradictory concepts South Korea concurrently
possesses: the development of self-reliance in the security realm, and dependence on the alliance
with the United States to deter any North Korean provocation. Snyder names South Korea's
burgeoning nationalism as root of this contradiction, bringing in the explanatory factor of national
identity.
While Snyder's analysis diverges from the dominant realist-based analyses, Snyder, like
Kang, does not provide a fully convincing argument as to why domestic factors would be allowed
to dominate South Korea's strategic calculus at the six-party talks, given that the South until very
recently viewed the North as its biggest threat, and given that the security situation has since
diminished on the peninsula. Also, much like Kang's dyadic comparison of U.S. and Japanese
strategy and the comparisons of China-U.S. strategy reviewed above, Snyder's studies, confined
as they are to comparisons of U.S. and South Korean strategy, are limited in terms of their ability
to provide a thorough analysis of the factors at play within the six-party process.
Indeed, very few studies provide a look at the tactics all of the negotiating parties bring to
the table. Rozman (2007) attempts to do so by describing the five Asian nations' strategic
choices during the six-party process, basing his analysis on the parties' regional historical
legacies.65 However, he does not clearly identify or delineate his explanatory variables, resulting
in a study more anecdotal than illuminative. Snyder (2007) looks at the varied reactions of the
five parties negotiating with North Korea to its October 9, 2006 nuclear test. However, his
analysis suffers from being limited to pivoting upon the immediate reactions following the test
itself, rather than offering an expanded analysis of strategies employed by the parties throughout
the duration of the talks. Thus, his study is merely informational rather than explanatory.
Park (2005) offers the most comprehensive analysis thus far of the six-party talks.66
Taking a look at all six states involved, he offers three propositions for explaining why strategies
have been so divergent; namely, the parties' domestic policy constraints, differing priorities, and
separate historical analogies for how denuclearization should be executed have hampered efforts
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to come to a consensus on strategy. Park does an excellent job of identifying and comparing the
varying interests each party brings to the talks, as well as their prioritization of the importance of
four related issues - nuclear proliferation, North Korean refugees, ballistic missiles, and Korean
reunification. In addition, several of the concepts and variables also chart fresh explanatory
terrain by delving into areas outside the scope of realism, such as his look at domestic political
constraints and historical analogy. However, Park does not delve further into an explanation of
how each country's negotiators arrived at their particular stance, and as such his analysis
functions as a comprehensive audit of state interests at the talks, offering nothing further toward
an understanding of what is driving these strategies.
These accounts begin to address how the six parties have had trouble coordinating
policies and strategies. What the existing literature lacks in are adequate explanations as to why
states would make particular strategic choices. As such, several questions remain insufficiently
addressed. First, why would a rise in aggressive signaling on the part of North Korea result in
Japan's increasingly pursuing its own domestic interests within the six-party talks, rather than
strengthening its approach by increasing coordination with its military ally, the United States?
The literature details Japan's hard push for a resolution to the kidnapping issue, but leaves
unexplained why this would so suddenly have become such a large and unavoidable concern for
policymakers, especially just after Koizumi had employed an engagement strategy in the years
leading up to the six-party talks. Given the existing threat, why is South Korea so intent on
engaging the North, especially in terms of economic incentives and food and energy aid that
many experts say are being partly diverted to its military? This is especially puzzling given that
the security environment has largely changed for the worse, with continued belligerent rhetoric
from North Korea coupled with increased military buildup and nuclear weapons development,
and when a little over a decade prior, the DPRK was considered a mortal enemy. What are
Russia's ambitions vis-a-vis the six-party talks? Just how much is the increased rivalry between
the China and the United States playing itself out at the six-party proceedings?
In addition, the analytical lenses through which scholars have peered onto the six-party
talks require further development: for example, existing accounts (especially those on Chinese
strategy) rely too heavily upon realism-based analysis without exploring the potential power of
other explanatory factors. Finally, as many of the studies are confined to two-country
comparisons, they are limited in terms of their ability to provide a thorough analysis of the full
range of factors at play within the six-party process. All of these leave the larger question
unexplained - why five states faced with the same grave security threat would choose such a wide
range of different strategies.
In order to address these puzzles, I will now enter into the main argument, providing a
country-by-country process trace of six-party strategy, and then applying my three analytical
lenses in order to ascertain which variable or variables - realist concerns, domestic political
institutions, and national identity - offer the most thorough explanation of the drivers at work in
strategy seen at the six-party talks. Based on the findings of my case studies, I will then accept or
reject the hypothesis for a particular country. Finally, I will offer a possible explanation for the
explanatory primacy of the strongest variable or variables for each country's strategy.
V. The Five States at the Negotiating Table with North Korea
1. China
a. Strategic Approaches within the Six-party Process
Despite North Korea's continued increase in its offensive capabilities throughout the six-
party process, Chinese negotiators have largely employed a strategy of engagement with North
Korea, with only a few mild pressure tactics used selectively. Negotiators' main red and green
lines seem related not as much to North Korea's nuclear threat than to a desire within the Chinese
Foreign Ministry to have Pyongyang listen to its requests.
Initially, Foreign Ministry officials preferred noninvolvement in the diplomatic process
surrounding the second North Korea nuclear crisis, wanting the issue to be solved bilaterally, as it
assumed North was developing nuclear weapons primarily as a bargaining chip to be used with
the United States.67 Beijing also did not trust Washington's intentions, and feared that it was
jockeying for regime change and wanted no part of endorsing such a plan.68
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Chinese foreign policymakers began to change their mind with North Korea's
provocative actions in early 2003, including restarting the reactor at Yongbyon, withdrawing
from the NPT and expelling IAEA inspectors. China voted for the February 12, 2003 IAEA
resolution that stated that North Korea had violated the NPT and referred the issue to the UN
Security Council. Several days later, on February 18, in a discussion held in Bejiing, Chinese
Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned North Korean Foreign Minister Park Nam-sun not to
cross the red line the United States set by restarting plutonium reprocessing or long-range missile
tests, warning also that any renewed provocation would also harm North Korea's relations with
the PRC.69 In March 2003, the oil pipeline from the Daqing oil field in northeastern China to
North Korea was shut down for three days, just after North Korea test-fired a missile that landed
in waters between South Korea and Japan, and during the time in which the Chinese Foreign
Ministry was pressuring its counterpart in Pyongyang to come to the then three-party negotiating
table. China has officially deemed the shutdown as due to technical maintenance, but analysts
note the significance of the timing and the silence from Beijing on the matter.70
In the same time period, Beijing strongly ratcheted up diplomacy, sending several high-
level officials to meet with Kim Jong-il and other top North Korean officials to urge for the
trilateral meetings and then the six-party format. By April 2003, Beijing officials had met with
their Pyongyang counterparts leaders 60 times and transmitted more than 50 messages between
the United States and North Korea regarding the nuclear issue.71
During the first round of six-party talks, the Chinese Foreign Ministry's role as
intermediary blossomed: it urged the United States to hold bilateral negotiations with North
Korea, and used shuttle diplomacy to keep the North in the talks.72 Throughout the talks,
whenever discussion hit a snag, Chinese officials worked behind the scenes with their
counterparts in North Korea, the other six-party members, and other nations such as Australia and
the UK to try to either persuade Pyongyang to return to the talks or convince the United States to
engage in bilateral negotiations. At the same time, throughout the duration of the talks, China
also repeatedly made efforts to distance itself from the U.S. stance. Four days after the first round
closed, China's ambassador to the talks Wang Yi told reporters in Manila that U.S. policy toward
North Korea was the main problem the talks were facing.73 In May 2005, after the United States
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had once again pressed China to push harder on North Korea in an attempt to gain a capitulation
from Pyongyang, Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao rejected linking "normal trade"
between China and North Korea to the nuclear issue, saying that Beijing opposed "trying to
address the problem through strong-arm tactics." 74
During the fourth round, Chinese negotiators once again drafted the closing document and
made clear to United States negotiators that if it refused to sign, it would have to bear
responsibility for the breakdown of the talks, thus paving the way for the September 19, 2005
Joint Statement.75 President Hu Jintao took a three-day state visit to North Korea on October 28-
30, 2005. According to the China Daily, Kim Jong II stated in talks with President Hu that "the
DPRK would honor its commitment and attend the fifth round" of the Six-Party talks. At this
time, Hu offered Kim a new package of aid and investment. This visit was reciprocated when
Kim Jong Il toured development projects in several of China's provinces and then held talks in
Beijing in January 2006.
However, Chinese negotiators and officials in Beijing have not been opposed to applying
pressure on North Korea on practival matters such as issues of economic reform and times when
Pyongyang opposed Beijing's requests outright. For example, when the U.S. Treasury
Department publicly announced Macau-based Banco Delta Asia's ties to nearly $25 million in
allegedly illicit North Korean funds, the Bank of China moved to freeze its own North Korean
funds. Also, Beijing strongly condemned the North's missile test on July 4, 2006, as prior to the
test, Premier Wen Jiabao had urged Pyongyang to abandon its test plans. However, Chinese
negotiators at the talks requested, along with their Russian counterparts, that the Japanese
negotiators' UNSC draft be edited to remove referral to U.N. Charter chapter VII, which would
introduce the possibility of the use of force. Still, this marked China's first signature on a full
UNSC Resolution against DPRK practices. Chinese officials, at the United States' behest, also
reportedly warned officials in Pyongyang just prior to its nuclear test not to go through with it;
senior Chinese leadership reportedly took U.S. concerns seriously and conveyed both
Washington's and Beijing's concerns and "red lines" to the North, and China may have even cut
off oil supplies in September under heavy test preparation rumors. 76 In the week leading up to the
nuclear test, in comments marking a strong departure from the usual avoidance of direct criticism
of Pyongyang, Chinese ambassador to the UN Wang Guangya said, "No one is going to protect"
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North Korea if it goes ahead with "bad behavior...I think if North Koreans do have the nuclear
test, I think that they have to realize that they will face serious consequences." 77  A few days
before the test, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao predicted it would not take place. 8
When North Korea went ahead with the test on October 6, 2006, China's Foreign
Ministry publicly called it "brazen" (hanran), a word normally reserved for actions China seeks
to strongly condemn. But when it was clear that another UNSC resolution would be drawn up,
Ambassador Guangya turned aside questions regarding whether China would now support a
sanctions resolution. 79 During the drafting process, Chinese negotiators insisted that the United
States negotiators' proposed version, which included requirement to inspect cargo going in and
out of the North, be diluted to say that countries would be requested, and not required, to do so.
Chinese negotiators said they would not participate in any searches of North Korean cargo, and
after the resolution passed indicated that it would not restrict their normal economic activities
with Pyongyang. 0 China temporarily froze financial transactions and bilateral economic
cooperation, but did not cut off the ubiquitous energy and food lines to the North.
Nonetheless, the subsequent UNSC vote marked the first time China was willing to
impose official trade and travel sanctions on North Korea. A senior Foreign Ministry official
privately admitted that the Chinese reliance on persuasion and incentives to gain North Korea's
cooperation had proven a failed policy.81 When the six parties signed onto the February 13, 2007
agreement, Christopher Hill personally credited Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei with bridging
the disagreement between Washington and Pyongyang.82
Throughout the six-party process, China has provided, by multiple estimates, 70 to 90
percent of North Korea's annual energy supplies, roughly 30 percent of its total outside
assistance, 38 percent of its imports, and one-third of its food imports, totaling up to 1 billion
annually in direct financial support.83
Strategy: Throughout the talks, Chinese negotiators and officials have employed a
continual stream of incentives, essentially propping up the North Korean regime with food and
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fuel aid, along with encouraging economic cooperation. Though Beijing has been willing to use
occasional pressure tactics, it has only used such strategies for very brief durations. The shift by
central decision-makers in Beijing toward a willingness to sign onto international sanctions in the
form of the two UNSC resolutions is quite unprecedented; however, the Chinese negotiators
(along with their Russian counterparts) made certain that these texts did not sanction the use of
force nor make imperative certain searches. Of the two red lines set up by Chinese negotiators
and officials in Beijing, the prohibition of North Korea's going nuclear seems tenuous at best in
the face of its overall strategy of engagement, suggesting perhaps that a nuclear-armed North is
less of a security concern to Chinese strategists than it may be to other nations in the talks. When
negotiators employed pressure tactics, it was due to North Korea's crossing of the second red
line: defiance of official requests made to the Pyongyang government by Beijing.
Sst - Organizer from Throughout: DPRK Throughout: Sticks: Cutoff of oil
sidelines; unwilling to establishing status as Following China's shipments, bank
endorse sanctions; nuclear state; open requests and interests transactions
primary source of DPRK defiance of
DPRK aid China's requests and Carrots: Oil and food
interests aid; economic
2 nd- Active cooperation (both
participant; willing to constant)
endorse sanctions;
primary source of
DPRK aid
b. Analysis of State Approach
In analyzing China's 'six-party strategy,' realist concerns hold strong explanatory power.
However, these concerns are more closely related to China's aim to maintain its regional rise than
to the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons. In addition, while the centralized nature
of international policymaking means that domestic political institutions do not factor heavily in
explaining China's strategic choices at the negotiating table, national identity offers some
explanatory power through China's increased tendency toward diplomacy and its centuries-long
historical memory as the regional hegemon.
i. Realist Concerns
While Beijing faces tangible security concerns vis-a-vis the North's nuclear program,
Chinese strategy at the six-party negotiations suggests a realist calculation based less on
balancing against the North Korea threat and blocking its economic gain and more on balancing
against U.S. and Japanese dominance and assertion in the region.
North Korea's nuclear aspirations do indeed present strong security concerns for China.
China does not want a regional nuclear arms race, nor a renewed conventional arms race, and it
certainly does not want either race to reach Taiwan, with which it still desires reunification.8 4
Another related and equally undesired scenario would involve a nuclear armed and belligerent
North Korea reinvigorating regional alliances, causing Taiwan to move closer to Japan and the
United States and eventually receive their permission to participate in their missile defense
system.85 China also does not want to have to choose sides should tensions escalate into military
action on the North Korea nuclear issue. Indeed, based on these threats, China has consistently
pronounced its discontent with North Korea's development of a nuclear weapons program
throughout the six-party talks.
However, China has practiced neither external nor internal balancing against the rising
North Korean threat through six-party strategy. China has also not shown its concern about
relative economic gain by limiting economic engagement with North Korea, the predicted
response to a threat under realist terms. In fact, some analysts have concluded that China's
ubiquitous oil shipments to North Korea indeed may be being used for military purposes by
Pyongyang.86 This would suggest a China less afraid of the North Korean military threat than an
initial observation of the change in balance of material capabilities would suggest.
Indeed, more than keeping North Korea nuclear-free, China's registered strategy shifts in
the six-party talks seem related to another realist calculation - China's own ambitions as a rising
power.87 China has not been secretive about its intentions to be a powerful state, with economic
might and military buildup part and parcel to this plan.88 Looking at its negotiators' stances
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during the six-party talks, Beijing's first shift in strategy - moving from indifference to a more
active role in the multilateral process - is related to the fact that Beijing realized it could leverage
a substantial role in the negotiations in order to keep U.S. regional primacy in check, and perhaps
to balance against Japan's interests, as well, as these two countries offer the greatest challenge to
China's rise. 89  Indeed, China's second shift in strategy at the talks - allowing for and
participating in sanctions against the Pyongyang regime - came after North Korea's defiance of
China's requests to not test missiles and a nuclear device, acts which led China to assert its
influence and attempt to 'put North Korea in its place.' This is part and parcel to China's
growing emphasis on great-power relations (daguo guanxi) as a top foreign policy priority. 90
Indeed, in the eyes of Beijing's policymakers, the North Korean nuclear problem is perhaps
"merely a proliferation issue," if that.9 1
In addition, China's engagement strategy and continued aid to the North seem linked to
Beijing's desire to protect its country's economic growth from damage, either through a U.S.
military confrontation of the North or a North Korean collapse. 9 2 Military action or reunification
could eliminate North Korea as a strategic buffer against U.S. military presence, bringing U.S.
troops up to the Chinese border. Either scenario would bring regional destabilization and a flood
of refugees. Over 34 percent of China's total trade in 2006 involved the United States, Japan, and
South Korea - countries that would be involved in any military conflict on the Korean
peninsula.93 This drive to sustain economic growth seems to stem not from an attempt to counter
North Korea's rise in capabilities, but rather to balance against the U.S. and Japan.
In sum, China's strategy during the six-party process is indeed strongly linked to realist
concerns, though having less to do with the immediate material threat of a nuclear North Korea
and more to do with China's desire to continue its economic and political rise in the region,
unencumbered by U.S. and Japanese attempts at balancing against it.
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ii. Domestic Political Institutions
In looking at China's domestic political institutions, while we do see China taking a
greater interest in DPRK policy and the six-party talks due to increased centralization of foreign
policymaking around Hu Jintao, the strategies Chinese negotiators have brought to the six-party
talks do not seem to be "hijacked" or adequately explained by these factors. In addition, while
state-society relations in the economic realm have seen a decrease in centralized regulation that
may partially explain why China no longer offers North Korea the type of economic exchanges
it once did, this factor also figures minimally in China's six-party strategy. Overall, we observe
no patterns emerging from China's six-party strategies that would suggest domestic political
factors have co-opted the process.
In terms of the domestic policymaking structure, competing political parties or
policymaking bodies do not come to bear on DPRK strategy at the six-party talks. While China
has indeed greatly decentralized and diversified its foreign policymaking setup as compared to
the eras of Mao and Deng, the process is still centralized, with the president's office at the helm
of much of DPRK policymaking. 94
In addition, China has seen a shift in its overall approach to foreign affairs with the
transition from the so-called third generation with Jiang Zemin at the core to the Hu Jintao-
headed fourth generation. This transition began with the 1 6 th Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party in November 2002, which brought Hu into the leadership position, and
continued with the 10 th National People's Congress in 2003. By the time of this latter event, Hu
had reported assumed responsibility for foreign affairs, and it was Hu who reportedly launched
the major diplomatic initiative to bring the United States and North Korea together for talks. 95
In terms of strategy at the six-party talks, this relatively centralized setup on issues of
foreign policy means there is little or no bureaucratic infighting to slow or hijack the process.
Furthermore, while China's domestic political setup gives Hu's office a large amount of control
on DPRK policy, which has resulted in Beijing placing increased importance on the talks as a
whole, the Chinese strategy seen at the six-party process is not explained strongly along the lines
of domestic political structural factors.
In much the same vein, relations between state and society in China rarely affect strategy
choice regarding international negotiation, the six-party talks being no exception. There are few
formal institutions that mediate between state and society on foreign policy issues, nor institutions
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allowing social forces to mobilize for their interests if they oppose the state's foreign policy,
making the central state quite autonomous from direct pressure. 96
However, state-society relations have shifted significantly under the transition to the Hu
Jintao administration in terms of economic control. Hu and his policymaking team have brought
"fervent pragmatism" in economic diplomacy to Chinese international economic policy, under
which Chinese private-sector international exchange on a market basis is growing strongly, with
the central government no longer steering at the helm.97 Under this more market-oriented setup,
the previous centrally executed economic exchange between Chinese firms and other states' firms
has all but disappeared. This is due to the fact that with these reforms in the realm of state-
business relations, it has become difficult for the government to mobilize resources from the
private sector for a centrally directed plan or bilateral government agreement. 98
China's economic relations with North Korea, once heavily centralized, were not spared
in this shift, either.99 For, as was seen in the previous section, while keeping North Korea
propped up economically is in China's security interests in order to avoid a flood of refugees and
North Korea's implosion, with the state no longer able to drive economic initiatives, current
investment in North Korea is paltry, as the North's weak economy and closed nature do not
provide a large or welcoming market by any standards. 1' In addition, North Korea has seen its
grant-type aid go from 14 percent of its total imports from China in 1999 to around 1 percent in
2008.101 We see this factor possibly affecting China's six-party strategy in the fact that China is
no longer offering the types of economic opportunities to North Korea it once had, keeping
economic exchange off the table as an incentive. In its stead, we see China offering only aid to
prevent DPRK collapse.
In sum, while we do see the relationship between China and North Korea changing due to
internal factors related to China's domestic policymaking structure, the strategies Chinese
negotiators have brought to the six-party talks do not seem to be "hijacked" or adequately
explained by these factors. In addition, while state-society relations in the area of business may
partially explain why China no longer offers North Korea the type of economic exchanges it once
did, the manifestation of this factor in China's six-party strategy is minimal (an "absence" rather
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than a tangible presence in terms of strategy). Thus, tracing the effects of domestic political
institutions does not offer a substantial explanation of the strategies Chinese negotiators have
brought to the talks.
iii. National Identity
In examining the first factor comprising national identity, norms on the use of force,
China's stance does not appear to have crystallized into a norm; therefore, its explanatory power
regarding six-party strategy is limited. In looking at the second identity factor, historical
experience, while China's legacy as an ideological 'brother' to North Korea bears little influence
on its strategy at the negotiations, China's centuries-long experience as regional hegemon
informs its current rise - an aspect that can be seen in its balancing against U.S. dominance at
the talks. This imbues the variable of national identity with some explanatory power in terms of
China's strategy at the talks, though the latter aspect overlaps a great deal with China's realist-
derived agenda to increase its power in the region.
Realist scholars have often portrayed China as possessing norms that sanction the use of
force in terms of maximizing power, security, or territorial integrity. 10 2 However, more recent
studies make a convincing case that Chinese policymakers in fact value diplomacy in order to
settle territorial disputes. 103 In a similar vein, other scholars argue that Chinese experts and
officials still abide by Deng Xiaoping's peace and development thesis, tending to view China's
regional security environment as generally benign and nonthreatening, citing as evidence the
approach taken in China's 2004 defense white papers and annual assessments published by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Academy of Military Sciences, and other state-linked policy
think tanks. 1' This second group of arguments sees China's policy toward Taiwan as an outlier
against a general strategy of diplomacy in Beijing. 05 Thus, though the existence of such a norm
one way or another is as of yet unclear, China's strategy of nearly unwavering engagement at the
six-party talks would seem to support the latter argument. Overall, though, this factor's
explanatory power vis-i-vis six-party strategy remains inconclusive.
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When looking at the second factor comprising national identity, China's historical
experience in world and regional affairs, it might seem likely that direct parallels between China
and North Korea would influence the choices Beijing's six-party strategists make. For China
and North Korea share a great deal of common historical experience: a physical border, a long
symbiotic relationship, a Confucian heritage, a history of Japanese occupation as well as fighting
alongside one another against U.S. and U.N. forces during the Korean war, a
communist/Marxist-Leninist ideological base, pariah status in the international community at
various times, and experience being refused of diplomatic recognition by all but a handful of
nations.106
However, the reality is that the relationship between the two countries is no longer one of
"lips and teeth." That period in fact was extremely short-lived: China and North Korea have not
shared that kind of closeness since North Korea began to veer toward its own unusual brand of
government.' 07 The relationship saw its precipitous decline correlate with the rise of Kim Jong-
il's influence in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the normalization of China-ROK relations in
1992, and the death of Kim Il-Sung in 1994. Between 1994 and 1999, contact between Beijing
and Pyongyang was almost completely severed. The late 1990s, while not acrimonious, were
marked by tension between the two countries. The North, angered at its unmet demand for
additional aid from China, led Kim Jong II to threaten to play the "Taiwan card" and set up
relations with Taipei. In 1997, Pyongyang's official news service called Deng Xiaoping a
"traitor to socialism" after China pressed the North to undergo economic reforms. Beijing in
turn threatened to halt food aid, at which point Pyongyang initiated talks with Taiwan about
opening direct air links between Taipei and Pyongyang, after which China dropped the threat. 108
Additionally, it was not until 1996 that China realized it would be in its interest to improve
economic ties with North Korea due to changing international relations in Northeast Asia (in
which South Korea and the United States in 1995 began to provide Pyongyang with aid), a fact
that helps counter any theory that China aids North Korea because of their lingering ideological
bond.
Clearly, direct historical experience between the two bears little influence on China-North
Korea relations, a fact borne out via Chinese strategy at the six-party talks. For although China
has kept energy and food aid and investment flowing to Pyongyang, and has been willing neither
106 Gregory J. Moore, "How North Korea Threatens China's Interests: Understanding Chinese 'Duplicity'
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to remove these engagement tactics nor apply significant pressure in its strategies at the six-party
talks, this stance has less to do with the two countries' shared historical and ideological legacy
and more to do with realist calculations regarding China's drive for power maximization.
China's six-party strategy can be better explained through another factor stemming in large
part from historical memory: China's past as the former regional hegemon. In fact, China's
current ascent marks not the first but the fourth time China has risen to regional great-power
status.109 China is now aiming to regain this status by becoming a world economic and political
power. 10 It has done so through strong regional economic engagement, particularly with Japan
and South Korea: China has been both Japan's and South Korea's number one trading partner
since 2004, and Japan is China's third largest trading partner. In 2005, China became South
Korea's top export market, as well.111' As covered above, through strategic provision of economic
and fuel aid, China is looking to retain influence on North Korea, making it more costly for North
Korea to ignore China's influence or harm its interests. 112 It again must be noted that this factor,
too, overlaps a great deal with China's realist-driven drive to maximize power.
Overall, while normative influences on China's six-party strategy are unclear, China's
national identity via its historical experience as regional hegemon bears a certain amount of
explanatory power in terms of China's strategy at the six-party talks - but with the qualification
that realist concerns also explain the same behavior.
In examining possible drivers of its six-party strategy, China's realist calculus, based on
growing as a regional power, factors the strongest in explaining its strategic choices at the six-
party talks. Following behind this variable in terms of explanatory power is national identity,
due to China's attempts to regain its status in the region as a factor of its historical legacy as
regional hegemon.
Given the findings of the analysis - that the strategies China's policymakers and
negotiators have brought to the talks stem from concerns primarily realist in nature - we do not
reject the hypothesis in the case of China - though there are two caveats worthy of mention. The
first is that the factor of national identity plays a noticeable role in explaining China's strategic
109 Wang Gungwu quoted in David Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order," p.
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calculus, as well. The second is that although realist concerns prevail in the findings for China,
the North Korea threat is not prime among its concerns; rather, balancing against other regional
military and economic hegemons - namely, the United States and Japan - takes precedence.
c. Origin Trace of the Strongest Explanatory Factors
[Realist Concerns/National Identity]
Why, then, would realist concerns and national identity combine to explain China's
strategy at the six-party talks? The answer I propose comprises two parts. First, in terms of
national identity, Deng Xiaoping's pervasive legacy of reform has led to increased pragmatism in
Beijing in terms of economic and security affairs. Second, in terms of realist calculations,
China's current myriad security concerns - not only beyond its borders, but within them, as well
- have led China to aim for economic growth beyond all other strategic goals.
When in the late 1970s Deng Xiaoping rose to become China's paramount leader, he
placed the modernization of China at the top of his agenda, attempting to usher in a new era of
"Reform and Opening to the Outside.""113 In 1978, Deng famously said that "to get rich is
glorious," symbolically marking the beginning of China's market reforms. Three decades later,
after a much-charted economic rise, China is at a place where its Communist Party can produce a
policy like the "xiaokang society" - envisioning a China in which the majority of the population
is middle class.' 14
In tandem with its continued economic drive, China conditions its present role on the
Korean peninsula upon compatibility with its general foreign policy and strategic interests, which
are to guarantee a stable periphery and to integrate further into the international community. This
includes promotion of economic cooperation with developed countries and elevating its image as
a responsible power - both of which work toward its goal of economic modernization, leading
China to press North Korea to acquiesce to its requests in the economic and security realms." 5
In addition, China hopes to raise the barrier for U.S. action against it, as well as U.S. ability
to contain or constrain China in the region. China has done so by attempting to bind the United
States through multilateral organizations, with the hopes that such organizations could create
norms and structures that limit U.S. involvement in regional security affairs, or perhaps force
113 Chen Jian, "Limits of the 'Lips and Teeth' Alliance: An Historical Review of Chinese-North Korean
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Wilson Center, September 2003).
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Washington to make unwanted policy trade-offs. As Chinese analysts see U.S. strategy as aimed
toward maintaining its global dominance and integrating China into an international system
heavily influenced by U.S. rules, China seeks to minimize perceived U.S. efforts to constrain its
regional aspirations. 116 China's behavior stems from its general foreign policy goals of
maximizing influence, leverage and freedom of action while pursuing economic development
towards its rise to great power status.
Along the lines of this focus on maintaining pragmatism in economic and security affairs,
Beijing not only pays attention to political and strategic considerations in its engagement policy
with North Korea, but commercial ones, as well. In engaging North Korea, China is also seeking
to boost its market share, as well as obtain greater access to the North's natural resources. North
Korea and China have set up a barter system using the North's natural resources."17 China also
needs overseas markets because its own domestic ones are saturated, as since the late 1990s
production capacity has outpaced internal demand."118
But economically, China does not cater to North Korea's needs - while the North desires
capital in the construction materials, machine building, and electronic communications sectors,
Chinese investment is heavily concentrated in the sectors wherein China's need lie or where its
companies serve to make the best profit - for example, resource extraction and the service
industry. China forged the "Agreement on Economic and Technology Cooperation" in May
1996, with China announcing resumption of "friendship prices" as a follow-up - actions all due to
pragmatic strategic consideration on the part of China.119
China's realist calculations vis-a-vis its North Korea policy of economic engagement
along with an interest in keeping more aggressive U.S. tactics in check both stem in large part
from Chinese decision-makers' desire to protect their country's economic growth from damage
either through a U.S. military confrontation of the North or a North Korean collapse. In short,
China wants stability.
Given this goal, there is another facet to China's realist calculations involving North
Korea: some scholars cite China's present top security concern as an internal one. 120 China is in a
phase in which domestic instability is increasing due to the transition from a centrally planned to
116 Evan S. Medeiros, "Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability."
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a market economy. If not managed carefully, this instability could fan social unrest. Taking an
historical view, events outside of China set off many political movements in Chinese history in
the last century, so the government is watching the DPRK situation closely for this reason, among
others. 12 1
While the strength of this factor is subject to debate, it is clear that sustaining a pattern of
economic growth is within China's best interests for domestic political purposes. China requires
an estimated growth rate of seven percent annually to create enough jobs for people entering the
workforce; falling behind this number therefore might create domestic turmoil. 12 2 The collapse of
North Korea, with the issue of refugees flooding over the border into China and the regional
instability it would produce, offers a severe threat to China's sustaining economic growth - and
thus a severe threat to its internal security, in addition to the external security factors North Korea
presents to China.
2. Japan
a. Strategic Approaches within the Six-party Process
Japanese negotiators have brought two distinct sets of strategies to the six-party talks.
The first was a policy of engagement through dialogue, replaced rapidly with one of containment
- though both are related far less to North Korea's actions involving its nuclear program than to
Japanese policymakers seeking resolution for the kidnapping issue.
In the year leading up to the six-party talks, Japanese officials saw unprecedented
dialogue with their North Korean counterparts, including the 2002 Junichiro Koizumi-Kim Jong-
il summit. However, it was at this summit that Kim admitted to North Korea's kidnapping of
Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s, a fact that would soon gain great importance in terms of
relations between the two countries. At the same time, Japanese lawmakers also enlisted stronger
tactics to deal with the North Korea threat. Japan joined as a Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI) participant from its onset in May 2003, and the government introduced a bill to authorize
economic sanctions without UN mandate. Both moves were directly aimed at ratcheting up
121 Gregory J. Moore, "How North Korea Threatens China's Interests: Understanding Chinese 'Duplicity'
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pressure on North Korea. Several Diet members pressed Koizumi to block remittances to North
Korea as the second nuclear crisis unfolded, but Koizumi remained reluctant to pursue sanctions,
reopening talks with Pyongyang instead.' 23
However, just as the six-party talks began, Japan began cracking down on DPRK
commercial shipping, and Tokyo policymakers also managed to severely slow the remittance
pipeline ethnic Koreans in Japan use to send money to relatives in the DPRK; this demographic
transferred $650-850 million annually in the early 1990s, but the figure had dropped to $200
million by 2003.124 When Koizumi returned to Pyongyang for a second summit with Kim on
May 22, 2004, he managed to negotiate for the release of five of the Japanese abductees' children
and the opening of an investigation into ten other abductees. However, the public mood was
beginning to shift further against North Korea: Koizumi's second visit was less well-received
publicly, and DNA testing in November 2004 revealed that remains North Korea returned to
Japan on the pretense they belonged to several kidnapping victims did not match up to their
identity. 12 5 During the same time, Japanese lawmakers had begun a stronger crackdown on North
Korean interests. In June 2004, parliament passed new laws allowing easier crackdown on
remittances to and trade with North Korea. These laws also added stricter monitoring of the only
direct ferry between the two countries as well as North Korean cargo ships. In September 2004,
the Liberal Democratic Party released a statement calling for North Korea to account for others
believed abducted, with economic sanctions called for should Pyongyang fail to positively
respond. 126
Through the first three rounds of the six-party process, Japanese negotiators remained
closest to the position held by their U.S. counterparts, though on several occasions Koizumi
remarked on needing to be in lock-step with others in the group. In March 2005, Koizumi stated
his reluctance to enforce sanctions, saying that the North need not be referred to the UN Security
Council. He also showed interest in a third Koizumi-Kim summit in Pyongyang. 127 As the
process continued, however, other lawmakers and the Japanese public began to press increasingly
for resolving the kidnapping issue.
After the missile test, Japanese officials requested an emergency UN Security Council
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session and drafted the initial UNSC resolution, which included reference to Chapter VII of the
UN Charter, which includes powers up to and including the use of force. In addition, Cabinet
Secretary Abe and other officials suggested the possibility of a pre-emptive strike, though were
later chastised by more moderate Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) members. 128 Following the
launches, Japanese lawmakers imposed bilateral sanctions on North Korea, including banning
ferry links, diplomatic visits, and charter flights. In addition, the Japanese military sought to
purchase 16 PAC-3 missiles from the United States. 129
When the North staged its nuclear test, Japanese negotiators took the lead next to the U.S.
negotiating team in a push for another, stronger UNSC resolution. Japanese lawmakers also
launched a number of new sanctions, effective immediately; Foreign Minister Taro Aso even
went so far as to discuss the nuclear option for Japan, a move that also brought rebuke from other
lawmakers. In drafting its UNSC resolution amendment, Japanese negotiators sought to place
additional restrictions on North Korean ships and aircraft as well as products, and to block North
Korean officials from being able to leave the country. 130 When these ended up excised from the
final resolution after negotiations, Japanese lawmakers imposed additional sanctions beyond the
resolution's wording, including banning North Korea's Mangyongbong 92 ferry from entering
Japanese ports. Tokyo also issued an advisory discouraging Japanese citizens from traveling to
North Korea. 131
When the February 13 Joint Statement was signed, Japanese negotiators refused to be
party to provision of energy with the other members aid until satisfactory resolution of the
kidnapping issue, and also refused to remove its economic sanctions, extending them for six
months on April 5, 2007.
Strategy: Japanese negotiators' range of strategies during the six-party process runs the
gamut. Beginning with a dialogue strategy clearly located at the engagement end of the axis,
Japanese negotiation tactics moved quickly toward those associated with containment, including
levying strong sanctions and threats to use force. This wide variance in strategy maps onto the
sudden entry of a new set of interrelated red and green lines related to resolving North Korean
agents' kidnappings of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s. Certainly, Koizumi's early
efforts seem to represent an attempt to "socialize" North Korea further into the existing order; it is
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less clear whether Japan's subsequent pressure tactics are in response to the threat of North
Korea's 'going nuclear,' however, as the new red lines coincided with the perception of Japanese
officials and the public that Pyongyang was providing an inadequate response to requests for
resolution to the kidnapping issue.
- Dialogue; pledge
to stay in lock-step
with other six-party
members
2 n - Pressure tactics;
unilateral refusal to
adhere to terms of
February 13, 2007
agreement
Throughout: DPRK
establishing status as
nuclear state; missile
testing or aggressive
posturing
2 nd - Continued refusal to
address kidnapping
concerns
Throughout:
Denuclearization
2 nd - Reopening
of and
satisfactory
investigation and
closure of
remaining 10
kidnapping cases
Sticks: Sanctions
on remittances,
trade,
transportation;
inspection of
vessels
Carrots:
Compensation
following
normalization
b. Analysis of State Approach
In analyzing Japan's six-party strategy, while realist concerns hold some explanatory
power in Japanese policymaking toward North Korea in general, they are not strongly manifest in
Japan's six-party strategy. Instead, the resolution of the kidnapping issue has trumped these
concerns at the six-party format. In addition, the bifurcated domestic policymaking structure, the
ways in which the Japanese state interacts with civil society groups, and a resurgence of
nationalism have brought the kidnapping issue to the fore in Japan's strategy at the negotiations.
i. Realist Concerns
While the security concerns Japan faced due to North Korea's weapons programs have
entered Tokyo's policymaking choices in other arenas, in the area of the six-party talks they hold
limited explanatory power, overshadowed by Japanese negotiators' focus on the kidnapping
issue.
An increased North Korean threat presents Japan with a number of strong security
concerns. First and foremost, Tokyo is already within North Korean missile range; this threat
will increase significantly if the DPRK becomes capable of fitting its missiles with nuclear
warheads. Indeed, Japan has reacted at other times and in other arenas to the security threat
posed by rises in North Korea's military capabilities. The start of the second North Korean
nuclear crisis saw Japan reacting with several major security measures: launching two
reconnaissance satellites over North Korea, moving to acquire Patriot Missile Defense systems
from the United States, and passing an Emergency Law to allow the Japanese military to respond
to threats more effectively. This was not a new phenomenon but a continuation of Japan's drive
to increase its military capabilities; after North Korea's 1998 Taepodong launch, Japan deployed
a home-grown spy satellite and granted authorization to its navy and coast guard to use force
against suspicious ships, which they did when they sank a North Korean vessel in December
2001.132
Yet when we turn our focus to Japan's range of tactics within the six-party talks, we find
it inconsistent in addressing the security concerns presented by North Korea's nuclear weapons
program. In terms of external balancing, during the initial escalation of the second North Korean
nuclear crisis, while the United States, Japan's main regional ally, pursued strong containment
tactics, Japan was more interested in a strategy of engagement. In fact, it was only after the
kidnapping issue became a focal point at the talks that Japan's strategy registered any strong shift
in reaction. While Japan's strategy began to line up with that of the United States, this by no
means represents a consensus in viewpoints between the two countries regarding the nature of the
North Korea threat, as Japan's red lines remain very different from those of the United States. In
fact, the red line for which Japan has employed its strongest enforcement tactics is related to the
kidnapping issue, not to the rise in North Korea's military capabilities.
In terms of reacting to any relative economic gain on the part of North Korea, Japan has
tried to stifle North Korean revenue generation, as policymakers in Tokyo have tightened the vise
on economic exchange with the North. However, this strategy of economic containment is again
tied to the kidnapping issue rather than to North Korean actions that would increase its military
threat.
Therefore, Japan's strategic calculus at the six-party talk seems less tied to realist
concerns linked to the North Korean nuclear threat and more to the issue of Japan's resolving the
kidnappings of its citizens.
132 For details on these security initiatives, see "Japan and North Korea: Bones of Contention,"
International Crisis Group, June 27, 2005.
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ii. Domestic Political Institutions
Japan's domestic politics are strongly linked to six-party strategy. First, the structure of
the policymaking process has explained the primacy of certain strategies at the six-party venue.
Second, the ways in which state and civil society interact in Japan have allowed for the
kidnapping issue (which began as a civil society concern) to be co-opted quickly into national
policy, manifest in the issue's prevalence in Japanese strategy at the six-party talks.
The structure of the Japanese state comes into play in six-party strategy-making in that its
setup has helped strengthen the ability of officials in power to carry out policies along their own
selected lines. When Junichiro Koizumi gained power in 2001, his new North Korea policy-
making mechanism was "very top-down and extremely closely held," engaging only a handful of
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) officials in communication with a few top LDP leaders in
the Koizumi cabinet. 133 This allowed Koizumi to pursue his initial policy of engagement with
North Korea, and then effectively switch tactics when citizens began demanding answers on the
kidnapping issue. With Koizumi's departure from prime ministerial office in September 2006,
Japanese policymaking on North Korea has been done via a 'two-track' structure, with the LDP's
abductions issue pressure group-related factions on one side and the official Cabinet Committee
on North Korea on the other. Again, evidence of this policymaking mechanism has surfaced
within the six-party talks themselves, for although MOFA drafted the statements to be used at the
talks, the prime minister and the chief cabinet secretary had to approve all language, ensuring that
the abduction issue has remained paramount in strategy Japanese negotiators bring to the six-
party table. 13 4
In terms of the second factor comprising domestic political institutions - state-society
interaction - two crucial components affect Japan's six-party talks strategy. The first is the fact
that political parties face election by popular vote in Japan; the second involves the particular set
of relations between state and civil society groups in Japan. Due to the first component, LDP
members have felt continued pressure to court popular opinion after the party's sudden and
troubling loss of parliamentary majority in 1993. After the public outcry following Kim Jong-il's
admission at the 2002 Koizumi-Kim summit that North Korea had indeed kidnapped Japanese
citizens, LDP members began to seize upon the issue and use it instrumentally in order for the
LDP to retain power. Indeed, Shinzo Abe rode the issue in order to cement his successful bid for
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party chairman in 2006.135
As for the second component, the Japanese state often "co-opts" movements in civil
society in a top-down manner to gain public approval - and in some cases, civil society is able to
reverse the process and infiltrate policymaking in a bottom-up manner.136 The kidnapping issue
itself began as a civil society movement, and was taken up by LDP politicians after the movement
had gained a foothold through local government-sponsored interest groups in terms of national
visibility.'3 7
Both components have helped to ensure that kidnapping concerns have stayed at the top
of the Japanese negotiators' agenda at the negotiations.
In Japan's case, we therefore see domestic political institutions affecting strategy at the
six-party talks on several levels. The need to retain public popularity has driven lawmakers to
court the kidnapping issue, and the bifurcated policymaking structure and relations between state
and civil society have allowed them to do so more effectively. This has led to the kidnapping
issue superseding six-party negotiators addressing other objective, empirical factors - namely,
resolving the issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
iii. National Identity
In looking at drivers behind strategy during the six-party process, aspects of Japan's
national identity indeed factor in the explanation. Japan's containment-oriented strategies and
threats of force at the six-party talks may represent manifestations of more hard-line lawmakers'
recent "slicing away" of its pacifist norms. In addition, Japan's resurgent nationalism has helped
fuel anger surrounding the kidnapping issue, keeping it a paramount public concern and thus
influencing policymakers to use the six-party format to push for its resolution.
Japan holds strong, constitutive pacifist norms, forged in the shadow of the memory of
the brutality and defeat of the Second World War and institutionalized within the subsequent
Peace Constitution of 1950.138 However, in recent years, a group of policymakers within the LDP
have been able to effect a slow "salami slicing" away of these strongly-established antimilitarist
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norms. 139  The strategies employed by Japanese negotiators during the six-party process -
containment measures, with several threats of use of force and a pushing for strong UN sanctions
that would reference such a possibility - may reflect this harder-line stance toward the North
Korea threat, as well as toward security issues in general among the more hard-line LDP camp.
However, the escalation of this chipping away at Japan's pacifism is a recent and still nascent
process, with the norm of pacifism still strong. 140 In addition, as was seen above, domestic
political structures and state-society relations provide a stronger explanation of why Japan's
choice in strategy would move in directions that do not match up to empirical security factors.
Offering a more compelling explanation of how ideational variables may be driving six-
party strategy is the second factor comprising national identity, historical memory. Japan's
legacy as a regional hegemon and colonial power in the first half of the 20 th century, coupled with
the rise of the North Korea and China's rise as an economic power in the region, have prompted
Japanese lawmakers and the public to begin to shift toward a new form of nationalism as a means
of shaping and protecting its security interests.141 Indeed, in particular, North Korea's actions in
the last decade - from the 1998 missile test to admissions of kidnapping Japanese citizens and its
development and testing of a nuclear device - have been a strong factor in lighting this nationalist
fuse in Japan. 142 The kidnapping issue in particular has galvanized the Japanese public in an
unprecedented manner: a March 2007 Yomiuri Shimbun survey showed 81 percent of those
polled supported the Abe administration's policy of not providing any economic and energy aid
to North Korea until progress is made on the kidnapping issue. 143 These forces have underscored
the importance of the kidnapping issue, helping explain its prevalence in Japan's six-party
strategy against what we might expect given objective, empirical factors.
In sum, Japanese politicians' chipping away at the country's strong antimilitarist norms is
possibly manifest in the strong pressure tactics and strategies of containment brought to the talks
- though this factor seems limited at best. Japan's collective memory provides greater insight
into why the kidnapping issue is paramount in Japanese negotiators' red and green lines;
however, domestic political institutional factors explain Japanese negotiators' deviation from the
strategies expected given empirical security factors. Thus, issues of national identity appear
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limited but present in steering the strategy choices made by the Japanese negotiating team.
In examining possible drivers of Japan's six-party strategy, instead of realist concerns, as
predicted by the hypothesis, domestic political institutions factor the strongest in explaining
Japanese strategic choices at the six-party negotiations. This is due to a calculated drive by
politicians to maintain popularity through the kidnapping issue, a policymaking setup that
ensured the issue would be pushed at the talks, and a particular form of state-civil society
relations that allowed politicians to take up the issue instrumentally. In addition, Japan's national
identity comes into play somewhat, for policymakers' strategy during the six-party talks may
represent a chipping away at Japan's pacifist norms, and its resurgent nationalism has contributed
to strong feelings of animosity among the Japanese populace toward the DPRK due to the
kidnapping issue.
Therefore, given these findings, we reject the hypothesis in the case of Japan.
c. Origin Trace of the Strongest Explanatory Factors
[Domestic Political Institutions/National Identity]
Why would Japan's domestic institutions and national identity come to bear so heavily on
its DPRK strategy? The answer I propose first requires a brief glance into the history of later
20th-century Japan's domestic political setup.
During the Cold War, the LDP was on the whole anti-communist and pro-U.S., with the
ROK recognized as the legitimate government on the peninsula in the Basic Agreement of 1965.
However, at the same time, there were at times pro-Communist or Socialist politicians within the
ranks of the diet. 144 In 1993, the long-ruling LDP fragmented and lost its grip on power, ushering
in a period of weak political leadership. Koizumi and his circle were able to again consolidate
power during the first decade of the 21 st century on the issue of revising Japan's Peace
Constitution, with their strategic addressing of the North Korea threat a major component of their
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Implications for the United States," pp. 24-28.
54
rise to popularity.
The particular historical nature of Japan-DPRK relations over the course of North
Korea's existence also requires elaboration. Given that North Korea is an extremely closed
country, what limited signaling it does is necessarily mapped onto existing perceptions to form a
cohesive whole from which perceptions - and then policy decisions - can be made. North Korea,
closed tightly, offered very little signaling that would allow for Japan to "make sense" of the
country. Japan's deep interactions with that part of the world all occurred during the colonial
period, when the nation was still one Korea. In addition, though Japan was ostensibly allied with
the United States during the Cold War, and thus North Korea was the stated "enemy,"
geopolitical dynamics were more complex than such an explanation would suggest. For, as
stated, throughout the existence of the LDP and within Japanese politics on a whole, factions
existed that were pro-China and pro-DPRK, with a large overlap between the two. In fact, even
through the early 1990s, some cabinets included diet members more sympathetic to North Korea
than to the South. 145 In addition, Japan's leaders did not fully "buy into" the United States' Cold
War rhetoric, but instead expertly instrumentalized the Cold War in order to get what they
desired, beginning with Shigeru Yoshida, who managed to keep Japan from rearming and joining
in the post World War-II Cold War struggle, as was the desire of the United States, to Takeo
Fukuda, who attempted to use the surge in the Cold War in the late 1970s to reverse the very
trend Yoshida had put in place. 146
The result? North Korea was largely ignored. When Japan's normalization talks with the
DPRK finally came, they were under the aegis of neighboring South Korea's late 1980s
nordpolitik policy. The issue was unique in that MOFA did not have a long history of
involvement with North Korea. Indeed, less than half of the Japanese population from the 1970s
until the early 1990s held a "bad impression" of North Korea - with the Japanese government
having largely ignored North Korea throughout the Cold War. 147 Contrast this lack of a
conception of North Korea with the situation after the 2002 Koizumi-Kim Dae Jung summit,
when nearly 82 percent of the Japanese public had a "bad" impression of the DPRK - with 90
percent naming the abduction issue as the most pressing concern. Where a void of information
once stood, several aggressive signals on the part of the North - including its 1998 missile launch
and its restarting its nuclear program - had effectively rewritten its identity for the Japanese
public.
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Indeed, Kim Jong-il's admission, coming at the 2002 Koizumi-Kim Dae Jung summit,
that his government had in the past abducted Japanese citizens, resulted in the public, by then
animated and intent on getting answers from the North about the lot of their own, largely
rejecting the subsequent Pyongyang Declaration. Indeed, from this point on, domestic concerns
effectively hijacked North Korea policy - namely, the public, pressure groups, and hard-line
factions within the LDP that sought nearly full attention on getting answers on the kidnapping
issue.
Far from being the most important issue on the diplomatic plate between the DPRK and
Japan, as it was at the 2002 and 2004 Koizumi-Kim summits, the movement to gain answers on
North Korea's kidnappings began with a grass-roots petition campaign in 1997. Soon after, a Diet
members group formed on the issue, and then a group of local-level legislators concerned about
the issue. Formal organizations followed, then a Cabinet-level committee, and then the passage
of related official legislation. 148
The issue is an emotional one for the Japanese public and a popular topic for the Japanese
media. However, the question remains: How did the issue gain such ground in Japanese political
and policymaking realms? A main factor was the issue's coinciding with heightened national
security fears regarding North Korea, appealing to the anti North Korean sentiment rising in
Japan at the time, fitting "very neatly into a particular political agenda." 149 The same North
Korea that had just 'announced itself' to Japan was now the subject of a great deal of public ire.
LDP politicians aiming to hold onto or gain popularity were keen to pick up on this. Koizumi
scored a diplomatic and public relations coup by bringing the issue to the first summit, and "rode
the tiger" as long as he could.150
But Koizumi may have in fact brought the spark to the tinder: groups dedicated to the
issue soon became more and more vocal about what they saw as a slight to the Japanese people
by a MOFA willing to take North Korea's word at face value and move on. 15' The sentiment
quickly spread to the general populace. In an attempt to retain popularity, Koizumi, though
personally more interested in dialogue than pressure tactics, shifted lead on the kidnapping issue
from MOFA to the more pressure-oriented Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe. His
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unrelenting push on the issue would carry him to his next post as head of the LDP. The North
Korea abductions issue, coming at exactly the right place and time for the harder-line faction of
the LDP, indeed proved a large component of the LDP's successful November 2003 election
policy platform. When the six-party talks began, a system was already in place wherein the prime
minister and chief cabinet secretary vetted MOFA's statement drafts for the meetings, thus
ensuring that six-party tactics clearly included the LDP line on North Korea. 152
Thus, the issue was able to quickly make the long journey from a grass-roots, civil
society issue to being effectively instititutionalized within Japan's international policymaking
structure - and thereby cemented into place as a paramount concern at the six-party talks.
3. Russia
a. Strategic Approaches within the Six-party Process
Russia has employed a strategy of engagement throughout the talks - though one marked
by its balancing (along with China) against the positions of the United States and Japan.
In the few years prior to the six-party talks, Vladimir Putin essentially reinvented modern
Russian relations with North Korea. Having fallen into total neglect under the Western-leaning
governments of post-Soviet Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, and with economic cooperation from
the DPRK's historically largest aid donor down to a trickle, Putin moved quickly to pick up the
pieces. He visited Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang in 2000, being the first Russian or Soviet leader to
do so. Kim reciprocated with visits to Russia in 2001 and 2002. Also in 2002, Putin resigned a
new version of the Russia-DPRK friendship treaty that was first signed in 1961 and which the
Yeltsin government allowed to expire in 1996. When the second nuclear crisis broke, Moscow in
January 2003 offered Pyongyang the so-called "package proposal" a step-by-step deal that would
bring Russian hydroelectric power to the North in exchange for denuclearization. The proposal
never made it into the six-party negotiations due to the dominant U.S. push for CVID.
But Russia was not ignorant of the threat North Korea posed to its interests. In July
2003, just before the talks began, however, Russian officials evaluated military preparedness in
the Far East for a worst-case scenario - and rumors even circulated in the Russian press that the
United States and Russia had discussed plans for a pre-emptive strike on North Korea's nuclear
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facilities, a move interpreted as a calculated leak by Moscow designed to exert pressure on North
Korea to inform an increasingly belligerent North of its limits vis-a-vis Moscow. 153 Nevertheless,
it was the dynamic of renewed diplomatic relations between the two countries that influenced Kim
Jong-il in 2003 to invite Russia to become the sixth member of the proposed five-party talks. At
the talks, Moscow has indeed acted as the buffer against U.S. strategies, as North Korea hoped it
would, at the second round endorsing Chinese negotiators' rebuffed drive for a joint statement,
and during the second and third rounds pushing United States negotiators to include energy aid in
any package deal with the North.154 In addition, Russian negotiators, along with their Chinese
counterparts, long resisted the drive by U.S. and Japanese negotiators to bring North Korea in
front of the UN Security Council, and then when Security Council actions were inevitable
following the North's missile and nuclear tests, Russian (along with Chinese) negotiators insisted
that the UNSC drafts be edited to remove the possibility of use of force.
While it has balanced against harder-line U.S. and Japanese strategies, Russia has not
been an apologist for North Korea's behavior. Just after the second round had resulted in no
agreement despite the South Korean negotiators' three-step proposal (see "South Korea" section,
below), Russia's ambassador to Seoul, Teymaruz Ramishvili, offered the observation that "four
countries are ready to make a deal. Two countries are not," referring to the United States and
North Korea. "When those two countries are ready, there will be a basis for negotiations," he
continued. 155
In May 2004, between the second and third rounds of the six-party talks, Russia joined
the PSI, but largely due to danger from former Soviet republics than as a means to pressure North
Korea. Following the nuclear test, Russian UN representative Vitaly Churkin declined to clarify
whether Moscow would support sanctions on North Korea. 156 After the October 2006 UNSC
resolution, Russian negotiators expressed that they imagined an easier path than did their U.S.
counterparts for North Korea to get the sanctions lifted.
After the BDA sanctions were lifted but North Korea was still refusing to come to the
talks because it was having trouble accessing its money, Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander
Losyukov was quoted as saying "There won't be any progress until the North Korean side says
that it has received the money." Losyukov continued, "We must be talking not now about
deadlines, but the fulfillment of all agreements," referring to the United States' failure to easily
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free up the funds.1 57 In the end, it would be a Russian bank that played a pivotal role in the
resolution of the BDA issue, allowing itself to be the intermediary institution that transferred the
suspect funds from BDA into an accessible North Korean account.
In early 2007, just before the February 13, 2007 agreement was reached, Moscow stepped
up talks on possible forgiveness of a substantial portion of North Korea's $8 million debt accrued
during the Soviet era, a move some journalists and policy analysts saw as a possible incentive in
order to encourage North Korea to come to a solid compromise at the six-party talks.' 58
In addition, throughout the talks, Russian negotiators have offered security guarantees to
both North and South Korea.
Strategy: Russia's strategic approach to the six-party talks saw little variance
throughout. This is no doubt due in part to the Russian negotiators' minor role in the
proceedings, overshadowed by the debate between the U.S. and North Korean sides, and the more
prominent outspokenness of the Chinese and Japanese sides. The general strategy the Russian
team has employed throughout is one of engagement, offering no pressure tactics or clear red
lines of their own, and (along with China) ensuring that the two 2006 UNSC resolutions did not
include the possibility of the use of force. Interestingly, policymakers in Moscow have also set
up increased economic openness with the Russian Far East on the part of North Korea as a green
line, rather than an incentive. Russia seems to be indeed attempting to "socialize" North Korea
into entering the international community, particularly in terms of economic interaction.
Throughout: Restrained Throughout: Throughout: Sticks: None
balancing against U.S. stance Unclear Increased
economic access/ Carrots: Possible
opportunities debt forgiveness
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b. Analysis of State Approach
In analyzing Russia's six-party strategy, realist concerns hold strong explanatory power
- though ones related to Russian policymakers' plans to regain Russia's economic and political
standing in the region than to North Korea's nuclear threat. In contrast, the centralized nature of
international policymaking coupled with a lack of state-society pressures regarding DPRK
strategy choice renders the explanatory power of domestic political institutions minimal.
Finally, Russian national identity offers some explanatory power, but rather than its former
Communist ties with the DPRK, this driver stems from Russia's historical memory as a great
regional power which, in turn, leads it to choose tactics at the negotiations that counter U.S. and
Japanese interests.
i. Realist Concerns
For Russia, security concerns stemming from the North Korea threat are not a major
factor in its strategies within the six-party talks. Instead, we see a drive to balance against U.S.
regional hegemony, as well as its offering of incentives to North Korea in the form of economic
opportunities. These strategies are related to Russia's realist quest to regain its status as an
economic and political power in the region, as well as its focus on internal balancing against other
would-be challengers via economic buildup.
The security concerns Russia faces vis-a-vis a rise in North Korean offensive capabilities
are not as high as the countries' shared border would suggest. The Russian Far East, while within
DPRK missile range, has an extremely low population as compared to Russia's western
territories. In addition, North Korean foreign policymakers brought Russia into the talks with the
hopes that its negotiators would act as balancers on behalf of DPRK interests - a sign that Russia
does not stand to directly face the brunt of North Korea's increased military capabilities.
This relatively low level of threat has allowed Russian negotiators at the six-party talks to
avoid having the North Korean security issue drive their strategy. They have set no clear red or
green lines regarding the DPRK threat. Instead, through their strategy of engagement with the
North, Russia's negotiators have acted as external balancers (alongside their Chinese
counterparts) against the United States team, pushing up against Washington's wishes to take a
harder-line stance on North Korea. This drive to remind the United States that there exist
alternative regional preferences is related to Russia's drive to (again) build great-power status in
Northeast Asia - also an approach to the six-party format similar to that of China. 159
Second, through its six-party strategy, Russia is practicing internal balancing, as well, by
seeking economic opportunity through railway link proposals and energy provision deals.
However, this is also not directed toward the North Korea threat. Instead, these tactics seem to
stem from Moscow's mercantilist leanings aimed at significantly bettering its economic status,
another realist calculation.
Third, instead of being concerned regarding North Korea's relative economic gain,
Moscow has offered Pyongyang incentives in exchange for increased economic access and
cooperation on projects, such as linking the Trans-Siberian Railroad to Seoul. Because all of
Russia's gas needs to be exported westward, a North Korean rail link would offer the most
expedient route to bringing gas and/or oil to the large energy markets of South Korea and
Japan.'16 It is therefore in Russia's best interest to keep relations friendly with North Korea.
Indeed, Moscow has used these substantial oil reserves as leverage to play China and Japan off of
one another as well as to boost its economy in its quest for more power. 16 1
Overall, Russia's aim for better economic conditions and influence in the region signals a
desire to increase its relative power. Thus, Russia's six-party strategy can be explained through
realist concerns, even though the threat from North Korea is not high in Russia's calculus.
ii. Domestic Political Institutions
In terms of the influence of domestic political institutions on the strategies Moscow has
brought to the six-party talks, the centralized nature of international policymaking means that
those in charge of making DPRK policy do not face internal bureaucratic pressures to select a
certain approach to the North Korea issue. In addition, North Korea's lack of viable economic
markets means that the business community does not pressure the government to alter its relations
with North Korea. Furthermore, Moscow policymakers' lack of pressure to meet the economic
concerns of the Far East Region that borders on North Korea renders state-society effects on
DPRK policymaking minimal. In short, domestic political institutions do not factor heavily into
Moscow's strategy at the six-party talks.
Russia's domestic political setup is strongly centralized, both in terms of party and policy
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decision-making. There exists little competition between political parties or policymaking bodies
within government that might try to hijack the decisions on strategy at the six-party talks.
Instead, Vladimir Putin has been behind most of the major decisions on DPRK policy throughout
the talks. 162
In addition, North Korea's utter lack of regulated financial markets and capital and its
balking at undertaking economic reforms mean there are no powerful Russian investors or
businesses pressing the Kremlin on opening up exchange with North Korea, and in turn the
Kremlin does not pressure the Foreign Ministry on the North Korea issue, relegating it to the
backburner in terms of international strategic priorities. 163
In terms of state-society relations that might affect North Korea strategy at the six-party
talks, the most likely candidate would be potential pressure on Moscow from politicians or
citizens in the Russian Far East seeking stimulus packages for the economically stagnated
region. However, policymakers in Moscow mainly seek to remove Chinese influence from the
Far East, representing a drive to retain territorial sovereignty rather than one aimed at improving
economic conditions for the citizens there. For example, when Moscow expelled a number of
Chinese merchants from the Russian Far East, the Russian citizens living there did not benefit
but in fact suffered due to the sudden lack of affordable versions of certain goods. Overall,
Moscow's centralized structure also eliminates any potential for societal pressure regarding
North Korea policy. 164
Thus, we do not see domestic political institutions pulling Russia's strategy at the six-
party talks in unexpected directions given empirical factors. This is due to the strong
centralization of the Putin government regarding decisions of international policy, as well as the
lack of pressure on the North Korea issue, either from businesses wishing to work with North
Korea (due to a lack of interest) or from citizens in the Far East (due to a lack of representation).
iii. National Identity
Though the modem Russian state is no stranger to the use of force, it has practiced an
engagement strategy with North Korea throughout the six-party talks. In addition, Moscow has
shed any shared Cold War-era amity for North Korea for a more pragmatic strategy, seen in its
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willingness to join the other six-party nations in condemning North Korea's behavior. However,
much like China, Russia's memory as a great power in the region has influenced it to choose
strategies that balance against U.S. and Japanese preferences in the six-party format.
Today's Russian policymakers and leaders are not afraid of the use of coercive measures
up to and including military force in order to protect state interests, including territorial integrity
and internal and external security. However, these norms regarding the use of force are not borne
out by Russia's strategies seen at the six-party talks. Instead, Russia has brought a consistent
engagement policy to the proceedings, despite North Korea's increase in offensive capability with
its development of nuclear weapons.
In terms of historical memory, the communist legacies of Russia and North Korea bear
little influence on strategy. For Russia, like China, while practicing an overall strategy of
engagement, has nonetheless been willing to bring harsh words and UNSC resolutions to bear on
North Korea rather than holding onto any legacy left over from a possible bond based on shared
ideological experience. This pragmatic approach toward relations with North Korea began in
the 1970s, when Soviet leaders viewed the DPRK as a buffer with China rather than as a reliable
ally, and carried through to Russia's 1990 normalization of relations with Seoul, much to the
anger of North Korea.165
More influential in this category is Russia's historical memory as a great power. Russian
politicians, Putin among them, often invoke the history of Russia's being a great regional power
that then endured an extremely rough transition from a communist system to a market-based one,
a shift that resulted in severe losses in the realms of economic and geopolitical clout.166
However, while Putin charted an initial drive to "reclaim" East Asian allies lost during his
country's Westward turn under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, these are not attempts to rebuild the past.
This aim for increased influence in region is a goal only inasmuch as it means a return to its status
as influential global diplomatic power, more realist concerns than related to an attempt to reassert
it itself in areas where it traditionally held influence. 167 This is manifest in Russia's external
balancing against U.S. and Japanese strategies during the negotiations. Thus, while issues of
national identity are somewhat present in this strategy, such balancing is more strongly explained
via realist calculus.
There is thus little to suggest that national identity is driving Russian policymakers'
choice of strategy at the six-party talks, as the drive to regain regional clout in the economic and
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political realms and balance against U.S. interests in the process simultaneously holds strong
links to Russia's realist concerns toward reclaiming great power status.
In examining possible drivers of its six-party strategy, Russia's realist calculus, while based
on its desire to rise as a regional power rather than on containing the North Korea threat, factors
the strongest in explaining its strategic choices at the six-party talks, rather than issues stemming
from domestic politics or national identity, as our hypothesis would predict.
Given the findings of the analysis, we therefore reject the hypothesis in the case of Russia
- though there are two caveats worthy of mention. The first is that the factor of national identity
plays a limited but present role in explaining Russia's strategic calculus, as well, due to its history
as a great power. The second is that although realist concerns prevail in the findings for Russia,
the North Korea threat is not prime among its concerns; rather, just as in the case of China, Russia
is more interested in a realist balancing against other regional hegemons, namely the United
States and Japan, takes precedence.
c. Origin Trace of the Strongest Explanatory Factor
[Realist Concerns]
Despite its limited economic and diplomatic influence within the six-party talks, why
would Russia's strategies be realist in nature, deriving from its desire for great-power status?
Russia is indeed pursuing goals primarily linked to international structural concerns rather than
more regionally-based power or security concerns. Given this, Moscow's external balancing
against U.S. harder-line tactical strategies during the six-party talks can be framed in the context
of recent geopolitical structural shifts.
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the pro-West administrations of Mikhail
Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin left North Korea behind in favor of strategic economic relations
with the wealthier South. 168 When Vladimir Putin became acting president in 1999 and then
president the following year, he unveiled Russia's 2000 national security and foreign policy
blueprints, which represented an expansive grand strategy aimed at regaining its status as a global
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power. In Putin's words, "in the foreseeable future, Russia will firmly take its place among the
truly strong, economically advanced and influential states of the world." 169
At the core of Moscow's international agenda are the concepts of balance of power and
spheres of influence, notions derived from territorial expansionism in Russian and Soviet history,
now coupled with an increased emphasis on economic interests. 17 In this manner, Russia seeks
to make its presence in East Asia felt via the six-party process, particularly in light of the fact that
the United States is far from welcoming its reemergence in international affairs."7  One
manifestation of this is Russia's offers of security guarantees to both North and South Korea.
Within this larger plan, Moscow's policymakers included a drive to increase engagement
with former Cold War allies, which resulted in two high-profile visits between Putin and Kim in
the years prior to the second North Korean nuclear crisis.
But another reason for the shift 'Eastward' in Moscow comes down to the bottom line:
Russia was seeing meager economic rewards in its courting of the West and of South Korea, the
latter which had invested far less in Russia than it had promised upon diplomatic normalization
between Seoul and Moscow. 172 Pipeline and railroad link talks with North Korea have no basis in
aid-based funding, as Moscow has made it clear that it will not fund such ventures. Thus, their
possible execution rests upon potential for market-based economic gain.173 It would indeed seem
that Moscow is interested in a wholly pragmatic approach to its geopolitical interests.
In sum, Russia's aims as seen via the six-party talks, while muted, are "purely
pragmatic," as it is using relations with North Korea to help further economic projects while at
the same time attempting to bring Russia back into major actor status in the Asia-Pacific. 174
4. South Korea
a. Strategic Approaches within the Six-party Process
Despite the rising nuclear power just across the border, South Korea's strategies during
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the six-party process have stayed firmly focused upon engagement, including heavy amounts of
aid and economic incentives.
In 2002, as the second DPRK nuclear crisis unfolded, Roh Moo-hyun campaigned on a
platform of a peaceful resolution to the issue, a pledge to continue Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine
Policy, and a more equal relationship with the United States, with his campaign at times courting
anti-U.S. sentiments. In his February 25, 2003 inaugural address, Roh unveiled his so-called
"Peace and Prosperity Policy." It included DPRK policymaking "on the premise that South and
North Korea are the two main actors in inter-Korean relations." 175
The newly incumbent Roh's visit to the White House in May 2003 would set the tone for
the divide between South Korean and U.S. approaches to the six-party process. Roh attempted to
get Bush to agree to dialogue, whereas Bush tried to get Roh to agree to pressure the North. 176
Early in 2003, responding to the U.S. increase of military forces in the region due to the nuclear
crisis, Roh told a trade union audience that "Koreans should stand together, although things will
get difficult when the United States bosses us around.""177
During the first and second rounds, South Korean negotiators tried to assert their
country's position at the talks by suggesting possible solutions, largely based on aid, energy, and
confidence-building measures. The three-stage proposal offered by the ROK negotiating team
during the second round seemed to be an attempt to meet North Korea halfway. It began with an
agreement from North Korea to be willing to give up its nuclear program, which would be met
with agreement from Washington to provide security assurances; next, North Korea's verified
freeze of nuclear activity that would be met with energy aid, and a final step of verified
elimination of the program."" U.S. negotiators rejected the proposal, insistent on CVID.
Showing his displeasure, President Roh in a televised speech in Mach 2004 that "step by step we
should strengthen our independence and build our strength as an independent nation."' 79 Two
days later, Roh rejected the tactic of pressuring the North, saying that engagement was a more
favorable strategy for South Korea. 180
By the third round, South Korean negotiators were more directly assertive, presenting a
rival proposal to the one offered by the U.S. negotiating team, the South Korean offer being more
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flexible regarding issues of timing and tit-for-tat offers. Following this flexibility, the 2004 ROK
National Security Strategy emphasizes resolution of all peninsular issues through peaceful
dialogue - no other options are even suggested, in contrast to the then-current U.S. NSS, which
suggested preemption. The ROK NSS also went onto state that the South and North are the two
parties directly concerned with this resolution. 181
Between the third and fourth rounds, Roh gave a speech in Los Angeles on November 12,
2004 in which he said that, given the security environment the North faced, it was
"understandable" for Pyongyang to develop nuclear weapons. During the 13-month hiatus
between the third and fourth rounds, South Korean officials offered a proposal to supply the
North with 2 million kilowatts of electricity - almost the total electrical consumption of the
DPRK at that time - in exchange for the North abandoning its nuclear programs. Seoul officials
also offered 500,000 tons of rice as food aid to the North as a goodwill gesture. 182
When the fourth round of talks began on in July 2005, the South Korean team furthered
the step-by-step concept by coining the phrase, "word-for-word, action-for-action," again
suggesting that Seoul did not agree with the U.S. insistence on CVID. 183 In the September 19,
2005 Joint Statement, the South Korean negotiators also reiterated their stance to provide 2
million kilowatts of electricity in exchange for the North's denuclearization.
After Christopher Hill announced the U.S. Treasury Department's sanctions on North
Korean funds following the September 19 agreement, South Korea's ambassador to the talks,
Chun Youngwoo, said that North Korea was being "besieged, squeezed, strangled and cornered
by hostile powers" and that the talks had suffered from "condescension, self-righteousness" and a
"vindictive approach" on the part of parties he left unnamed - clearly the United States.' 84 A
December 2005 South Korean Blue House paper called for separating aid from the six-party talks
and praised China's stance throughout the proceedings. 185
After North Korea's nuclear test, the South Korean Ministry of Foreign affairs reserved
its displeasure for Japan's strong reaction rather than the test itself, save for lukewarm official
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statements. 186 The subsequent UNSC resolution provided the Roh administration with a major
headache, for now that the Security Council had resolved that the DPRK's conduct was a matter
infringing "international peace and security," Seoul's position of engagement and reconciliation
had been undermined. 187 However, the South went along with the UNSC resolution, though
doing as minimal amount as it could under the terms of the resolution: Seoul delayed the
resumption of inter-Korean ministerial talks until after the Feb 13 agreement, and withheld
400,000 tons of rice aid until the Feb 13 agreement was implemented. It also made clear that its
normal economic activities with the North would not be affected. 188 When the February 13, 2007
agreement was struck, South Korean negotiators agreed to be sole provider of the initial 50,000
tons of fuel aid. After the February 13 agreement, allegations surfaced that Seoul officials had
pledged additional aid to North Korea in a back-door deal. South Korean negotiators also
pledged 400,000 tons of rice on April 22, despite the fact that the North had missed the deadline
upon which food aid was contingent, per the February 13 agreement. 189 In addition to providing
aid, the South Korean government has joined up with major national conglomerates to help fund
two large-scale economic cooperation projects with the North. The first is the Kaesong Industrial
Complex, located 30 minutes north of the DMZ and begun in March 2005, with the South Korean
factories operating there paying North Korean workers a set wage garninshed by the DPRK
government. The other major inter-Korean economic project is the Mount Kumgang tourist
resort, located in the two countries' eastern Gangwon Province over the North Korean border.
South Korea has also pressed for the restoration of rail links between the two countries, severed
since the Korean War. The railroad saw its first test in spring of 2007.
Overall, South Korea's strategy has thus both directly and indirectly involved a number
of aid packages and economic development projects.
Strategy: South Korea's strategy at the six-party talks, like Russia's, has seen little
movement away from engagement. South Korean negotiators remained extremely reluctant to
even mention the possibility of any substantive sanctions or pressure tactics, a reflection of the
policymaking environment toward Pyongyang in Seoul in general during the Kim Dae-jung and
186 "Parties See Internal Splits after North's Test," Hankyoreh Shinmun, October 20, 2006.
187 James Cotton, "North Korea and the Six-party Process: Is a Multilateral Resolution of the Nuclear Issue
Still Possible?", pp. 33.
188 "China May Be Using Oil to Press North Korea," The New York Times, October 31, 2006.
189 "After the North Korea Nuclear Breakthrough: Compliance or Confrontation?" International Crisis
Group, April 30, 2007.
Roh Moo-hyun presidencies. Though the South Korean government - like that of all five parties
negotiating with the DPRK - has officially said a nuclear North Korea would not be acceptable,
policymakers and negotiators have been very vague about specifying related red lines and
introducing the possibility of sanctions should the North cross them. Indeed, though South Korea
is the most geographically proximate country, and has a history of North Korea as a bitter enemy
in war and Cold War tensions, South Korea elicited the most muted reaction to the North's
nuclear test. Its continued incentives for the green lines of increased cooperation and better
relations from the North suggests it is trying to "socialize" North Korea - though perhaps not in
terms of its threat but rather its isolation from the international community, especially from its
"brother" to the South.
Throughout: Proposing Throughout: Left Throughout: Warmer Carrots: Aid and
step-by-step, tit-for-tat undrawn relations from economic
initiatives; Promoting Pyongyang, greater cooperation
economic cooperation; support for economic (constant)
Incentives only cooperation projects,
more separated-family Sticks: None
reunions
b. Analysis of State Approach
In analyzing South Korea's six-party strategy, realist concerns do not hold strong
explanatory power - a seemingly contradictory stance, given South Korea's alliance with the
United States, its proximity to the North, and the bitterness of the two Koreas' belligerent history.
While domestic institutions do offer some explanatory power regarding Seoul's negotiation
strategies, due to a strong executive with a president capable of 'stacking the deck' with
policymakers sharing his political beliefs, the variable with the most explanatory capability is
national identity, with South Korea's ideological pendulum "swinging back" toward a policy of
engagement with the North after decades of military rulers that based their power on portraying
the DPRK security threat as South Korea's primary concern.
i. Realist Concerns
South Korea's strategy of engagement and unconditional aid - despite an increased
threat from North Korea - runs counter to what we would expect to see in South Korean tactics
at the talks, which would entail drawing closer to its alliance with the United States and
coordinating a balancing strategy, along with attempting to cut off the North's economic lines.
While North Korea's threat is certainly physically real for South Korea, it does not factor high in
driving Seoul's negotiation policy at the six-party talks.
For South Korea, the empirical security threat from North Korea is very high. The on-
the-ground security situation continues to be very volatile, with the two Koreas' militaries
engaging in several fatal exchanges over the past several years. In addition, North Korea
continues its bellicose rhetoric toward the South through its national news service. South Korea
remains heavily militarized, with a two-year mandatory conscription for males and 28,000 U.S.
troops currently stationed there, as well. In fact, the two countries are still technically at war,
having signed an armistice rather than a peace treaty. North Korea's development of nuclear
weapons has thus greatly worsened an already volatile security situation. Yet, despite these
objective factors, we see little of South Korea's strategy at the six-party talks related to security
concerns.
In terms of balancing behavior and alliances to counter this threat, South Korea
maintains a military alliance with the United States, forged during the 1950-53 Korean War.
However, during the six-party process, South Korean negotiators have been completely
unwilling to bring their strategies to any agreement with those of the U.S. side, sticking instead
to a strategy purely of engagement. In addition, South Korean negotiators have used virtually no
pressure tactics against the North on issues of security. While publicly speaking out against
North Korea's drive for nuclear weapons, South Korean policymakers and negotiators alike have
been vague about setting related red lines or threatening possible sanctions. Their reaction to the
missile and nuclear tests was among the most muted of the five negotiating parties.
Most notably, as for concerns regarding relative economic gain, despite the threat
offered by the North, South Korean policymakers have not actively blocked North Korean
economic activity; on the contrary, they have been the second-largest aid donors after China, and
have set up several high-profile inter-Korean economic exchange programs.'"
In sum, realist concerns bear little influence on South Korea's range of strategies seen at
the six-party talks, as on the part of the ROK, we see almost no responding to security threats,
balancing behavior, or concern over economic gain vis-A-vis the rising North Korea threat.
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ii. Domestic Political Institutions
South Korean domestic politics bear some explanatory capability regarding South
Korea's six-party strategy, due to the country's strong executive and the president's ability to
select policymakers based on his own political and ideological criteria, as well as a shift in state-
civil society interaction that has opened up discourse on North-South relations.
In the case of South Korean domestic politics, a superficial split exists in the North Korea
policymaking structure between the more hard-line Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(MOFAT), which has greater contact with the U.S. and South Korean military establishments,
and the Ministry of Unification, which has greater ties with the Roh Moo-hyun Cabinet and
affiliated lawmakers in the National Assembly. 191 Fittingly, the Ministry of Unification largely
helps coordinate the Mt. Kumgang tourism project and the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which
have come under fire from both MOFAT and Washington for helping keep Pyongyang (and
perhaps its nuclear program) afloat. 192  However, despite this split, which might suggest
competition regarding which strategy to take at the negotiations, a strong, hand-picked executive
under Roh has allowed his policy of engagement on North Korea to stick. This is the result of
Roh granting a substantial amount of power to the secretariat surrounding the presidential office,
making it responsible for screening information and controlling policy output. Since the
secretariat is appointed by the president, Roh has been able to "stack the deck" with former
lawyers and those with his own political ideology toward reconciliation with the North."'93 This
structural setup has allowed Roh to pursue his preferred engagement strategy with North Korea at
the six-party talks, despite the heightened security threat.
State-civil society relations also play a part in South Korea's strategy at the six-party
talks. Following Korea's 1987 democratization, 1992 saw the election of the first opposition
candidate, Kim Young-sam, followed by fellow opposition candidates Kim Dae-jung in 1997 and
Roh Moo-hyun in 2002. All three had fought against the dictatorial governments, and all three
helped open up the space for a freer press and the ability of civil society organizations to speak
openly about reconciliation with North Korea, a topic that had been taboo during the military
dictatorships and punishable under the National Security Law. 19 4  With this new space of
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discourse opened, pro-reconciliation interest groups - such as the large group of separated-family
survivors seeking to be reunited with their family members living in the north - were able to
press government and politicians for increased dialogue with North Korea. It is this same sector
of civil society from which Roh drew his policymaking team, especially his reunification
ministers, who were given a great deal of clout in the executive.' 95
Therefore, looking at domestic political institutions in South Korea adds insight into
understanding South Korea's six-party strategy. This includes a strong executive selected by the
president, as well as shifting state-civil society relations that allow for the discussion of
reconciliation with North Korea, once deemed illegal by the government.
iii. National Identity
While South Korea's lack of norms condemning or restraining the use of force seem to
contradict its engagement strategy with the North, the ROK's historical memory, based on its
status as a divided nation as well as factors related to its experience moving from military
dictatorship to democracy, figures strongly in explaining its strategic choices at the six-party
talks.
South Korea does not hold normative restraints regarding the use of force - it maintains a
strongly militarized culture, participated in a brutal civil war, sent 300,000 troops to join U.S.
efforts in Vietnam, sent peacekeeping troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and has seen several recent
fatal naval skirmishes and gun battles with North Korean soldiers. 196 However, the strategy that
South Korea has employed toward the North in the six-party talks - one of nearly unconditional
engagement - does not map onto these norms.
Holding greater explanatory power in terms of national identity is South Korea's
historical legacy. Aspects of South Korea's history that shape its national identity include its
memory of the 1910-45 colonial period under Japan, its division into two, and the experience of
dictatorship that followed.
First, South Korea's reactions to the missile and nuclear tests - anger seemed more aimed
at Japan's strong reaction than at North Korea - is a telling reminder of the bitterness and
competition South Korea feels against Japan as a product of their historical legacy.
Second, South Korea's historical memory and identity as one half of a divided nation
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helps explain why it has not moved to ally with U.S. strategy during the talks. The same 2004
South Korean National Security Strategy mentioned above, which underscores the importance of
the South Korea-U.S. military alliance, also contradictorily states Seoul's desire to gain military
autonomy from Washington, which still has operational command during wartime, ceded during
the Korean War. While fear of U.S. abandonment or entanglement given the U.S. military's
global posture changes and strategic flexibility doctrine most likely factors in, as well, this quest
for autonomy on the part of South Korea can also be explained through a strong desire to "regain
control" of its own destiny based on its identity as a 'nation divided.' In addition to Seoul's six-
party posturing away from the United States, this aspect of its national identity is also manifest in
burgeoning nationalism and incremental street rallies calling for increased distance from the U.S.
military. 197
The final component of historical memory that affects six-party strategy is South Korea's
recent political shift to democracy from the military regimes that ruled during the 1960s through
the late 1980s. South Korea's dictatorships propped themselves up on a platform of "total
security," citing the North Korea threat; even South Korea's rapid economic development was
framed in pure realist terms as a means of increasing security. 198 Flash forward to the present, in
which the security situation has not substantially changed - yet the South is offering substantial
aid and economic incentives to its once-sworn enemy. This is due to the embrace of a people-led
democracy movement that seeks to distance itself from the security-based military governments
of the past, and has led a societal shift that has seen the election of opposition politicians Kim
Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, who both carried a policy of engagement policies with North
Korea - the policies that in turn drive South Korea's strategy at the six-party negotiations.
Thus, in terms of aspects of South Korea's national identity, South Korea's norms on the
use of force do not seem related to the tactics its negotiators have presented at the six-party talks.
However, South Korea's strategy seen at the talks seems to have much to do with its historical
experience - of being a divided country, at first under military rule that required the North Korea
threat for its own survival, and then under democratic regimes that sought to right the wrongs of
those years.
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In examining possible drivers of its six-party strategy, as predicted by our hypothesis,
rather than realist terms, South Korea's national identity, based on its status as a divided nation
as well as its experience moving from military dictatorships to democracy, factors the strongest
in explaining its strategic choices at the six-party talks. In addition, domestic political
institutions hold explanatory power, due to South Korea's strong executive and its president's
ability to select policymakers based on his own political and ideological criteria, as well as the
opening up of state-civil society relations, allowing for discourse on reconciliation with North
Korea.
Given the findings of the analysis, we do not reject the hypothesis in the case of South
Korea.
c. Origin Trace of the Strongest Explanatory Factors
[National Identity/Domestic Political Institutions]
Although our hypothesis predicts that South Korea's small military and economic size
would deem it less concerned about structural power shifts, its situation is a unique one: its
capital sits roughly 30 miles from the demilitarized zone dividing it from North Korea, with
which it is still technically at war. Given this, we might expect security concerns to at least
somewhat factor into South Korea's negotiation strategy toward the North. Instead, why would
national identity and domestic politics figure so heavily in ROK strategies at the six-party talks?
The answer must therefore involve a fundamental shift in South Korea's threat perception vis-a-
vis North Korea.
South Korea maintains a military alliance with the United States; however, the
relationship is fraught with tension and growing resentment from a nationalistic South Korea
desiring autonomy. Polls bear this out: a 2002 Munhwa Ilbo survey showed that 73 percent of
Koreans surveyed thought that Bush's policy toward the North represented a major impediment
to North-South reconciliation. 199 In addition, a 2003 JoongAng Ilbo/CSIS/RAND survey found
that more South Koreans chose increased cooperation with North Korea (39 percent) than with
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the United States (24 percent). 2 00 A survey in January 2004 showed that South Koreans felt the
United States to be a greater threat to their security than the North, with 39 percent saying they
felt the United States the biggest threat and 33 percent selecting North Korea. Finally, a July
2004 Korea Times poll showed that more than 60 percent of South Koreans thought that aid to
North Korea was acceptable and/or should increase. 20 1 In contrast, in 1993, only 1 percent of
South Koreans chose the United States as the largest threat, with 44 percent selecting North
Korea.20 2
So, why this strong move away from the U.S. alliance and toward a 'softer' perception of
North Korea? I argue that it has to do with South Korean citizens' experience under the military
dictatorships that ruled South Korea with barely a pause from 1953 until 1987, and which were
heavily reliant upon pushing the propagandistic image of North Korea as a belligerent, alien
ideologue and number one security threat. However, I need to address why South Korea would
shift from one perception of North Korea to its essential opposite. The answer would have to be a
large-scale paradigm shift - one a major event most likely caused. Indeed, South Korea has just
such an event in its history: the sudden and momentous democratization that transformed the
nation in 1987.
Under the Park Chung-hee and subsequent Chun Doo-hwan dictatorships, harsh rhetoric
against North Korea had been especially co-opted by the government in order to secure its power
base. When these leaders were undermined with Korea's move toward democratic rule, so, too,
was what they stood for in popular thought, so that South Korea today is a society in which hard-
line tactics are looked at suspiciously as attempts to roll back political reforms.203
But South Korea's democratization had not one but two effects: not only did it undermine
the previous governments' portrayal of the North Korean regime, it also called into question their
organization of society under the rubric of "total security." In terms of this second effect, South
Korea's dictatorial governments had maintained a policy of "total security" - that is, the very role
of economic development was to shore up security. Indeed, the military was the largest
beneficiary of government resources during South Korea's dictatorships, and Park Chung Hee's
huge push toward growth in the heavy-chemical industry was to produce forward and backward
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links to the defense industrial sector. 204 South Korea's rapid industrialization and drive for "total
security" required a subversion of any aspect of an active civil society, which was in turn linked
to the state's strong anti-Communist identity and hard-line security stance. The state derived its
very legitimacy from these two pillars - economic growth and state security - and the latter the
ruling elites equated with regime security, themselves all military men having seized power via
coup. At the same time, South Korea's democracy movement had been ongoing since the
country's inception. It encompassed two conflicting conceptions of "democracy," the first a more
moderate, procedurally-based understanding and the second a more radical notion referred to as
the minjung, or "people" movement.20 5
The minjung movement's three main tenets were democracy (minju heonbeop), an end to
exploitation of the people (minjung haebang), and the drive for reconciliation and peaceful
reunification with the North (minjok tongil), the last especially taboo under the military regimes.
When the push for democratization came to a head in 1980 and again in 1987, the fight was
through the efforts of adherents to the minjung movement. When the authoritarian government
was finally forced to allow open elections, the minjung conception thus gained immediate
legitimacy over the more moderate notion of democracy. The result of democratization was that
many years of civil society repression "exploded in the political space opened by the minjung
movement."206 Because the now-delegitimized authoritarian regimes had bundled together
regime security, economic growth, and repression of civil society, the anti-North Korea "total
security" doctrine was thus subject to extreme scrutiny at the same time the minjung philosophy
was given new stature, including the idea that North Korea should be treated as long-lost brother
rather than bitter enemy.
Indeed, with the advent of democracy and a destabilization of the long-existing historical
analogy and "total security" framework, the government removed the strictest tenets of the
National Security Law, allowing for civil groups to emerge, eventually gaining societal influence
on such previously popularly undiscussed notions as reconciliation with the North. Indeed, the
change was not overnight - there was a transition period in which the stickiness of the prior view
of North Korea can be seen: Fear of war has dropped not precipitously but steadily, with only 36
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percent of citizens considering a North Korean invasion possible when polled in 1990, down from
80 percent just after democratization in 1987.207 The Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun
administrations have taken a notably different tack than the governments that came before them,
all linked in some way to South Korea's militarist past. With engagement the mantra, the ROK
abstained at a December 2005 UN vote to rebuke North Korea for its human rights record,
including the abductions issue. As was documented above, Roh filled his administration with
domestic human rights advocates and those formerly imprisoned under the military dictatorships.
However, the Roh camp has paid a political price for continuing this policy despite the
North's recent actions, particularly as this camp has refused to yield to domestic political shifts
back toward some sort of middle ground with the North. This perhaps represents a sign that the
perception of North Korea has not seen a pendular swing to the opposite side as the perception
held during South Korea's dictatorships. While in April 2003, 69 percent of citizens wanted
continued engagement under the Sunshine policy, by the end of 2006 more than two-thirds of the
country saw the need to revise the engagement policy. Yet still the Roh administration forged
onward with economic engagement, only briefly stopping aid even after the North's nuclear test,
and garnering harsh criticism both at home and abroad. Roh's approval ratings bottomed out as
low as 14-15 percent in December 2006, before his term ended the next year.
The drive to settle the score based on the wages of the past may have played itself out for
a public increasingly frustrated with a North Korea that receives aid unconditionally, as South
Koreans in elected as president Lee Myung-bak, a conservative with a harder-line stance toward
North Korea. In South Korea, it would seem, the ideological pendulum has not yet come to an
even temporary rest regarding the North Korea issue.
5. The United States
a. Strategic Approaches within the Six-party Process
Looking at the range of red and "green" lines that United States negotiators have brought
to the six-party talks, we seen an insistence throughout on complete, verified, irreversible
dismantlement (CVID) of North Korea's nuclear program before the United States would be
willing to grant any concessions or incentives. Washington has also maintained steady economic
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sanctions on North Korea, occasionally ratcheting them up based on increased belligerence from
the North.
In the first few years of the George W. Bush administration, security policymakers in
Washington were already formulating the general shape of its North Korea policy. Speaking on
condition of anonymity, officials involved describe a fragmented interagency process pitting the
East Asian bureau of the State Department and some within the National Security Council
seeking negotiations with more hard-line voices within the administration seeking to scrap the
Agreed Framework or any talks with the North.20 8 The resulting document was finally cleared in
June 2001. It listed four areas of interest for the United States to pursue with the North: nuclear
weapons, the conventional military balance, missile technology, and human rights.209 The
dominant officials in DPRK policymaking during the first George W. Bush administration
maintained a stance largely separate from their Clinton administration counterparts in dealing
with North Korea - namely, a lack of willingness to hold direct bilateral meetings with the
North.210 In addition, the United States' 2002 National Security Strategy mentioned brutal
regimes and weapons of mass destruction, the assertion that deterrence is unlikely to work on
leaders of such nations, and that preemption may be necessary, with North Korea one of the
unspoken targets of this language.211 The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review went further, specifically
identifying North Korea in its contingency war plans.212 On December 16, 2002, Bush approved
a Presidential Directive on bolstering missile defense that also referred to North Korea by
name.
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At the same time, United States military planners worked to bolster military power in
Northeast Asia as the crisis unfolded, dispatching several additional squadrons of warplanes to
the theater in late January and early February 2003, and on February 6, Secretary of State Colin
Powell told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "no military option has been taken off
the table" with North Korea. The Bush administration urged the IAEA to refer the issue to the
United Nations Security Council, which it did on February 12, 2003. On May 31, 2003, President
Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a multinational consortium aimed at
curbing the transport of weapons of mass destruction and designed specifically with North Korea
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in mind.214 In July, word leaked to the press that the military was working on a new plan for
possible escalation of tensions with North Korea, including measures aggressive enough to worry
critics that it would in fact be tantamount to provocation of war.215
All of these actions were to prevent North Korea from crossing the first red line the Bush
administration put forth: the restarting of plutonium reprocessing, which North Korea did in July
2003, a month before the six-party meeting, when Pyongyang officials said they had finished
producing enough plutonium from the 8,000 extracted fuel rods for six bombs. The next red line,
which President Bush clearly stated in several presidential addresses, was North Korea going
online as a nuclear weapons state, and once the talks were underway, Bush and the U.S. six-party
negotiators were insistent that North Korea fully abandon its nuclear programs and submit to
inspections - complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement - before the U.S. team would be
willing to bring any other offers to the table.2 16
In the first round of talks, chief negotiator James Kelly floated the idea of a joint
statement with "vague reassurances" that the North not be attacked, but Washington officials
refused to codify this in words.2 7 The United States again dangled the possibility of a written
security guarantee for North Korea, this time through the words of President Bush on October 19,
2003, after the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, while at the same time
ruling out a formal non-aggression treaty.2 18
The second round resulted in the six countries forming a working group on the talks that
would meet more frequently than the regular format. By the third round, U.S. tactics seemed to
shift: Assistant Secretary Kelly held two-and-a-half hours of direct talks with his North Korean
counterpart, Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan, the longest bilateral discussion thus far.
Kelly presented a seven-page document, reviewed by China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea,
detailing what benefits the North could receive if it abandoned its nuclear program. The proposal
was a two-stage elimination of the nuclear program, including freezing and then dismantlement,
subject to verification by an international body. The incentive immediately offered was the
provision of heavy fuel oil by the parties involved, with "security assurances" and further
addressing of energy needs upon completion of requirements. 219
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North Korea's reaction was muted, as the United States' negotiators were still requiring
Pyongyang to make the first move. In addition, after the third round, North Korea announced it
would not attend preparatory working meetings leading up to the next round, scheduled for
September 2004, placing blame on the United States' "hostile" attitude. 220 In February 2005, the
North announced through its official media that it possessed nuclear weapons.
The United States ratcheted up its defense posturing in response. On March 15, 2005, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Armed Forces drafted a paper that discussed plans to allow
combatant commanders in Northeast Asia to request presidential approval to carry out preemptive
nuclear strikes on "rogue" states threatening the United States or its allies with weapons of mass
destruction. The paper continued by saying that U.S. submarines that make regular port calls in
Yokosuka, Sasebo, and Okinawa in Japan are prepared to be loaded with nuclear warheads if
necessary. It named North Korea specifically as one of the top threats being taken into
consideration.22 1
Nonetheless, the change in negotiating tactic toward bilateral discussion seemed to hold
for at least a short period of time: in the first phase of the fourth round, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice reportedly gave new chief negotiator Assistant Secretary of State Christopher
Hill permission to conduct unlimited number of bilateral talks with North Korea, and he took
advantage of this by meeting privately with his North Korean counterpart Kim Gye-gwan before
the talks opened, though throughout the round Hill repeated the mantra that the six-party
negotiations would yield a result only if it remained a multilateral process. 222 In addition, Hill did
not agree to the North's request for a light water nuclear reactor for energy purposes, continuing
to reject any future nuclear program for North Korea. Despite U.S. negotiators' prior refusal to
budge on the two issues, the agreement at the end of the second and final phase of this round
included not only a nonaggression pledge and a move toward future normalization of relations
between the United States and the North, but also opened the possibility of a light-water reactor
for the North's energy needs.
However, perhaps precisely because of this "backtracking" on prior U.S. tenets such as
the light-water reactor issue, the United States negotiating team remained reluctant even to sign
the September 2005 Joint Statement - it did so at the China team's behest and to avoid sole
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responsibility for the breakdown of the talks. 223 At the same time, this statement was the first in
which the United States agreed to reconfirm in writing that it would respect North Korea's
sovereignty. On September 15, before the ink had dried on the joint statement, the U.S. Treasury
Department told Banco Delta Asia (BDA) to cease its dealings with North Korea or lose access to
U.S. markets. Depositors' panic led BDA to freeze $24 million in North Korean funds. On top
of this, Assistant Secretary Hill seemed to reset the U.S. position in his closing speech to the
press, specifying that the statement's "appropriate time" to discuss North Korean light water
reactor prospects would only be after "complete dismantlement." He went on to say that "the
U.S. acceptance of the Joint Statement should in no way be interpret as meaning we accept all
aspects of the DPRK's system, human rights situation or treatment of its people" and said the
United States was fully ending the KEDO program.224 That same month, Bush appointed hard-
liner Jay Lefkowitz as Special Envoy on North Korean Human Rights.
It was in this environment that phase one of the fifth round broke down, with the North
Korean negotiators requesting bilateral negotiations with their U.S. counterparts, only to be
rebuffed, and then departing the talks and refusing to return to the negotiating table. That same
month, the United States cosponsored a resolution at the UN General Assembly condemning
North Korea for its human rights abuses. In late 2005, U.S. state department officials proposed to
Pyongyang to allow Assistant Secretary Hill to visit, but demanded a Yongbyon shutdown; the
North rejected the proposal.225 The March 2006 recension of the United States' National Security
Strategy included the DPRK among the states named as demonstrating "tyranny" which "must not
be tolerated." The document then goes on to specifically refer to Pyongyang's "record of
duplicity and bad-faith negotiations." 226 The April 2006 Track II talks in Tokyo, in which the six
parties participated, saw the United States again refuse to join bilateral discussions. The United
States also refused to attend an informal Chinese-hosted six-party dinner at those talks.22 7
After the North's missile test on July 4, 2006 and test of a nuclear device on October 9,
2006, United States negotiators took the lead along with the Japanese team in drafting the two
subsequent UNSC resolutions, pushing for mention of the force-sanctioning Chapter VII of the
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UN Charter. In a statement made the day Pyongyang announced the nuclear test, President Bush
seemed to have shifted the red line, threatening "consequences" if the North participated in "the
transfer of nuclear weapons or material." 228 Two days later at a press conference, Bush evaded
multiple questions about the fact that his administration seemed to have moved the red line from
"don't test" to "don't proliferate." He also reaffirmed the conviction that bilateral negotiations do
not work.229
The talks finally reconvened for a brief second phase December 18-22, 2006, with the
bulk of energy focused on continued calls by the North Korean team for the United States to free
up North Korea's $24 million in BDA funds. Despite the continued rhetoric against bilateral
negotiations, Washington officials contacted the North Korean embassy in Beijing and set up
end-of-December bilateral talks there, and met again in January 2007 in Berlin. At the third
phase of the fifth round, U.S. negotiators agreed to the February 13, 2007 Joint Statement, along
with the promise that the $25 million at BDA be unfrozen prior to the first 30-day deadline per
the Joint Statement following the talks, much to the dissatisfaction of hard-liners in the Bush
administration.230
Both before and throughout the talks, the United States Treasury and Justice departments
have maintained an array of sanctions on North Korea - as of October 2006, at least 40 separate
measures against the country as a whole, and at least 15 against North Korean business entities.
The U.S. places these sanctions under four general categories: North Korea's posing a threat to
U.S. national security, North Korea as a state sponsor or supporter of international terrorism;
North Korea as a Marxist-Leninist state with a Communist government, and North Korea's
alleged proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.231
Range of strategies: While United States policymakers changed their stance regarding
whether or not their negotiators could hold bilateral meetings with North Korean representatives
at the talks, at first refusing them but later acquiescing, the strategy the U.S. team has brought to
the table falls in the middle of the axis between engagement and containment - though closer to
the latter pole. With hard-liners in the first Bush administration bandying around threats of
squeezing Pyongyang to force regime change, alongside direct threats of the possibility of
228 "President Bush's Statement on North Korea Nuclear Test," October 9, 2006.
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061009.html)
229 See "Press Conference by the President," The White House, October 11, 2006
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military intervention, U.S. strategies were at first at the very end of the axis toward containment -
bordering on coercive, in fact. These tactics saw a slight relaxing in more recent rounds -
including President Bush's pledge to deliver a written security guarantee to North Korea,
something denied flat-out at the start of negotiations. However, the incentives offered by U.S.
negotiators have been paltry - amounting to "considering" removal of existing sanctions rather
than the provision of new incentives, and keeping the issues of peaceful nuclear energy and
economic interaction safely at bay. Overall, the U.S. negotiation team has maintained its push for
CVID through a steady application of pressure tactics, making it a strategy of containment,
indeed aimed at blocking any increase in North Korea's power.
V - Solely
multilateralism;
pressure tactics;
CVID first
2nd - Bilateral-
multilateral
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b. Analysis of State Approach
In analyzing the United States' six-party strategy, realist concerns hold strong
explanatory power, as most of the tactics U.S. negotiators have brought to the talks have been
reactions to the North's gain in either offensive capabilities or attempts to cut off its economic
supply lines. In addition, while the strong executive seen especially in the first George W. Bush
administration helped hard-liners steer North Korea policy, they did so along realist lines,
rendering domestic politics of limited influence. Finally, national identity offers a certain amount
of explanatory power, as both norms of preemption and a Cold War dichotomy based on
historical experience may have informed U.S. policymakers' reluctance to attempt engagement
tactics with North Korea.
i. Realist Concerns
The strategies United States negotiators have employed at the six-party talks point
strongly to the primacy of realist concerns, due to negotiators' immediate reactions to shifts in the
security situation, U.S. attempts at external balancing against North Korea in the talks, and
negotiators' and lawmakers' attempts to block North Korea from seeing any economic gain.
For the United States, objective security concerns stemming from the North Korean
nuclear program are high. First, the immediate regional threat to U.S. interests is stark, with
American troops stationed in South Korea, Japan, and Guam within DPRK missile firing
distance.232 Second, the economic impact of a conflict in Northeast Asia would also be
devastating to the United States. Third, with the rise in U.S. concerns about state or non-state
actors waging terror attacks, the U.S. fears the sale of nuclear material to the highest bidder.
Indeed, we see the U.S. negotiating team addressing these security concerns through their
tactics at the six-party talks. The range of red and green lines United States negotiators have
brought to the six-party talks are based on an insistence on complete, verified, irreversible
dismantlement (CVID) of North Korea's nuclear program before any concessions. For example,
although the September 13 agreement contains step-by-step, tit-for-tat measures, the United
States has said it will not provide fuel aid until CVID is accomplished. In addition, the United
States' two main red lines throughout the negotiations have been 1.) testing a nuclear device, and
2.) proliferating nuclear material; both red lines relate directly to security concerns, as do the
main pressure tactic and incentive of military intervention and regime change versus a security
guarantee. When the North crossed the first red line, U.S. negotiators reacted immediately,
drawing up strong sanctions and shifting their tactics from a more hard-line stance to engagement
in a strong attempt to 'reach' North Korea, though an attempt still based on security concerns.
Coupled with strong strategic reactions to immediate security concerns, the U.S. has
indeed practiced external balancing within its six-party strategy. U.S. negotiators and officials
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have tried to rally China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea to ally with it in terms of strategic
approach, as well as in executing possible military measures against the North.233
It is harder to tell whether internal balancing on the part of the U.S. is directly related to
the North Korea issue, as the United States is already the regional and world economic and
military hegemon and, as such, practices internal balancing against a number of competitors.
Moreover, this strategy has not directly entered into U.S. negotiators' strategy at the talks in a
noticeable manner.
Certainly visible in U.S. six-party strategy, however, is the third component of realist
calculus: concern about a threatening state's economic gain. U.S. negotiators and policymakers
have kept a tight financial squeeze on North Korea, introducing new economic sanctions
throughout the six-party process in addition to the ones already in place, and offering very limited
incentives, essentially amounting to a 'ratcheting down' of its pressure tactics rather than actual
concessions in the interest of cutting off all cash flow to the North.
Overall, U.S. strategies at the six-party talks point strongly to the primacy of realist
concerns, due to negotiators' immediate reactions to shifts in the security situation, U.S. attempts
at external balancing against North Korea in the talks, and negotiators' and lawmakers' attempts
to block North Korea from seeing any economic gain.
ii. Domestic Political Institutions
In terms of domestic political influences on U.S. six-party strategy, while state-society
institutions hold little sway over the proceedings, competing bureaucratic pressures do come to
bear on certain tactical shifts at the six-party talks - namely, whether or not to engage in bilateral
discussion with North Korean negotiators. However, domestic political factors on a whole offer a
limited explanatory purview of strategies the U.S. has employed at the talks, including red and
green lines and the use of incentives versus pressure, which have remained largely tied to realist
concerns.
The structural makeup of the U.S. foreign policymaking process has affected
Washington's DPRK strategy at the six-party negotiations in several ways. First, U.S.
negotiators' consistent rejection of bilateral talks would appear a result of the United States'
strong executive during the first Bush administration, as both Congress and the public had
233 See Rumsfeld's memorandum proposing the U.S. ally itself with China in order to isolate and bring
about a collapse of the Pyongyang regime, in Samuel S. Kim, "China and North Korea in a Changing
World," in Uneasy Allies, Fifty Years of China-North Korea Relations.
become dissatisfied regarding the administration's policy of refusing bilateral negotiations with
North Korea, even as the tactic continued at the talks.234 In addition, analysts have deemed U.S.
reluctance to use any engagement strategies with North Korea as coming from a "deep-
seated.. .bureaucratic resistance" within the U.S. government of ever trying to negotiate with
North Korea. 235
This entrenched resistance began even before the talks, in 2001, when the new Bush
administration sought to divide up the task of DPRK policymaking. National Security Council
(NSC) nonproliferation officials were given the reins on what could be offered at the talks, which
many in the State Department saw as a power grab by hard-liners on the issue.236 Indeed, these
hard-liners would dominate the first George W. Bush adminstration - an influential group
consisting of Vice President Dick Cheney's office, Pentagon officials and Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld, Undersecretary of State John Bolton - opposed negotiations. State Department
faction, led by Secretary of State Colin Powell and later Condoleezza Rice, Deputy Secretary of
State Richard Armitage, Kelly, and Christopher Hill - believed in negotiations. 237 There was
some overlap in these groups, with dialogue people in the NSC and hard-liners in the State, but
this overall dichotomy prevailed in terms of policymaking. Speaking off the record, officials
involved described a fragmented interagency process stemming from ideological debate between
State Department officials and hard-liners in the NSC and president's office, headed by Bush,
who has not made his disdain for the North Korean regime a secret.238
In June 2004, the State Department received more say in crafting U.S. six-party strategy,
largely due to staff shuffles within the hard-line camp and continual pressure from the State
Department for dialogue; shortly thereafter, the State Department introduced bilateral discussion
into the six-party process.2 39  The February 13, 2007 agreement was the result of Rice's
convincing of President Bush to sign onto the deal, much to the anger of the former hard-line
"hawks" who the previous term had quashed dialogue, including former undersecretaries of state
Robert Joseph and Bolton.240
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The decision-making power vested in the U.S. Congress has also affected strategy,
contributing to the paltry nature of incentives put on the negotiating table by continually pressing
North Korea economically. Human rights have remained the legislative's number one concern
throughout the talks, regardless of whether the majority in Congress was Republican or
Democratic. This has consisted in Congress' consistently blocking of funds for North Korean aid
and passing the North Korea Human Rights Act in October 2004 - which, despite its title, in fact
constrains the ability of the executive to provide economic assistance to North Korea.241
The second factor comprising domestic political factors - state-society relations - bears
little effect on U.S. strategy at the talks. If this aspect has had any effect at all, it would perhaps
be in the president's desire to retain public popularity. Bush was willing to turn to engagement in
his second term in part due to his then-falling approval ratings with the U.S. military bogged
down in Iraq and the November 2006 Congressional elections, which saw Republican control
wrested by Democrats. 242 Looking for some small victory, Bush turned to Hill and Rice and their
belief that the agreement could work.243 However, this tactical shift is more fully explained by
the particular U.S. domestic political structure and the bureaucratic pressures exerted on DPRK
policymaking than by state-society relations.
In sum, U.S. domestic political institutions help explain certain aspects of U.S. strategy
at the six-party talks. Overall, however, while tactics such as bilateral versus multilateral -
including red and green lines and incentives and pressure - have remained along a realist tack.
Thus, while there is some explanatory power held by domestic political factors, realism seems to
more fully explain the U.S. strategic shifts at the six-party talks.
iii. National Identity
National identity offers a certain amount of explanatory power in terms of U.S. strategy
choices at the six-party talks. First, norms sanctioning the use of force in statecraft inform U.S.
threats to use military action on North Korea. Second, a historical legacy based on Cold War
experience informs U.S. policymakers' leveling of sanctions as well as the lines of balancing
drawn at the six-party talks.
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U.S. norms on the use of force have always included military action as an option of
statecraft. In addition, in recent years the Bush administration has pushed a standard of
preemption, made official in the 2002 National Security Strategy and put into action the
following year in Iraq. 244 Both the overarching norm allowing for use of force as well as the
preemption doctrine are evident in U.S. six-party strategy: U.S. officials and negotiators alike
have introduced the threat of military force on North Korea. This has included officials directly
stating the possibility in press conferences, discussing the desire for regime change in North
Korea, and negotiators' withholding of a written security guarantee for the North through the first
several rounds of negotiations.
In addition to norms, collective historical memory also helps shape U.S. policymakers'
thinking on North Korea strategy. U.S. policymakers read the situation on the Korean peninsula
through an understanding dating back to the Cold War era, topped off with memories of the brutal
1950-53 war the United States and UN forces fought alongside South Korea with the DPRK.24 5
A look at the list of official sanctions tells us there are still lingering effects from that historical
experience: North Korea's status as a Marxist-Leninist state with a Communist government is the
reason the U.S. State and Treasury departments cite for nearly 20 percent of U.S. sanctions levied
upon it as of October 2006. 24 6 In addition, balancing seen in the United States' six-party
strategies, while also explained by realist concerns, does indeed follow largely along (simplified)
lines of Cold War-era regional balancing, with Japan and the U.S. on one side and China, Russia,
and North Korea on the other. (Only South Korea has not assisted in recreating Cold War-era
patterns of balancing at the talks.)
Therefore, national identity - through norms that see force as a viable tool of statecraft,
as well as historical experience of the Cold War - thus factors in U.S. six-party strategy-making.
In examining possible drivers of its six-party strategy, this study finds that the strategies
United States policymakers and negotiators have brought to the talks stem from concerns
primarily realist in nature.
Given the findings of the analysis, we do not reject the hypothesis in the case of the
United States - though there are two caveats worthy of mention. First, domestic political
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institutions factor into strategic choices, as bureaucratic divisions within government bring a
competition of approaches. Second, national identity also plays a noticeable role in explaining
the United States' strategic calculus, as well, due to a rising norm of preemption as well as
lingering historical memories from the Korean War and Cold War era.
c. Origin Trace of the Strongest Explanatory Factor
[Realist Concerns]
Why are the United States' strategies at the six-party talks primarily driven by realist
concerns? Beyond the immediate security concerns addressed above, two main components
contribute to a possible explanation; the first is related to recent events, and the other to long-term
strategic goals. First, the changing threat environment after September 11, 2001 reorganized U.S.
security policymakers' priorities regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Second, the United States' long-term strategic goals, not only on the Korean peninsula but also in
Northeast Asia on a whole, call for a reassertion of U.S. strategic primacy in the face of China's
rise.
The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001
understandably reshaped U.S. thinking on its global security priorities. First and foremost, the
United States' highest priority became keeping terrorists or 'rogue' states from acquiring
weapons of mass destruction.2 47 Highest among these weapons to watch is nuclear material, the
transfer of which to state and non-state actors President Bush has deemed "the single most serious
threat facing America today."248 North Korea remains one of the prime areas of concern for U.S.
security strategists.
At the same time, a "distinctly American" brand of internationalism entered statecraft. In
1999, George W. Bush, on the campaign trail, spoke of a "distinctly American internationalism"
that presented a United States seeking to export its economic, political, and cultural values. 249 A
year after the events of September 11, 2001, this concept had made its way into the National
247 President Announces Reduction in Nuclear Arsenal November 13, 2001
248 Bush, Kerry Debate Foreign Policy Goals, National Public Radio, September 30, 2004
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Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999
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Security Strategy. 250 While this may sound more like an intervening domestic variable, the result
has been to re-entrench U.S. realism. For, given this shift in thinking, the United States has
become increasingly skeptical of the capacity of multilateral machinery to deal with the new
"post-proliferated" environment, while it has become more resolved to use its national power in
response to perceived threats.25 1 Where multilateralism is inevitable, the United States has
challenged its partners to take dramatic steps along the lines of its priorities. Unsurprisingly,
these steps often contradicted the partner states' threat perceptions, as well as the interests and
views of their constituencies.2 52 Nowhere is this more evident than in the six-party process,
where the United States has expected the other four parties negotiating with North Korea to
support U.S. preferences and positions. These two factors - a changing threat environment, and a
"with us or against us" mentality - have served to keep U.S. strategy at the six-party process not
only set on realist goals but also steers U.S. negotiators toward a tactic of unilateral decision-
making even within a multilateral negotiation process.
In addition to the perception and diplomacy shifts seen in the post-9/11 environment, the
United States has more traditional, overarching realist goals in Northeast Asia: it seeks to retain
its military and economic dominance in the region. One method the United States has employed
is to get peer competitors 'bound up' in multilateral processes - though ones in which the United
States voice remains the dominant one. Through this method, the United States tries to shut out
peer competitors through a combination of engagement and binding. With China's rise a direct
challenge to this, Washington has attempted to get Beijing involved in multilateral processes,
foremost of which being the six-party format.253
These two factors contribute to an understanding of why the United States and its
policymakers would view the North Korea issue through a primarily realist lens - though one
with a decidedly unique, American 'tint,' which involves a changed perception of the U.S. role in
security matters after September 11, 2001 and moves to keep not only North Korea but Northeast
Asian peer competitors in check, China foremost among them.
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6. Summary of Major Influences within the Six-party Talks
1. Realist Concerns
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Given the findings of the process trace and analysis sections,he e thesis - that the region's
rising or current powers (China, the United States, and Japan) will base their six-party strategy
upon realist concerns, whereas the less powerful countries in the region (Russia, South Korea)
will employ strategies less dictated by international structural pressures and derived more from
domestic factors - must be rejected overall. This study finds the following: United States
negotiators have brought to the six-party talks a mixed strategy leaning more toward containment,
and one indeed stemming primarily from realist concerns related to the North Korea threat. It
finds that South Korean negotiators' strategy of engagement at the six-party talks is fueled by
issues of natinaal identity and domestic political institutions rather than by realist calculations.
However, while Chinese negotiators seem to follow a realist line of thinking at the six-party talks,
so, too, do the Russian negotiators. In addition, in both cases, the states' six-party strategies lean
toward engagement rather than containment of North Korea; rather, both states seem to be
balancing against U.S. interests in the region. Finally, the study finds that in the case of Japan,
instead of forming strategy at the six-party talks primarily through a realist lens, sees the domestic
institutional setup come primarily into play, encouraging policymakers and politicians to bring
the non-security related concern of North Korea's kidnapping of Japanese citizens into its six-
party negotiation strategy. In addition, national identity, in terms of Japan's resurgent
nationalism, also factors in its citizens' and policymakers' strong reactions to the kidnapping
issue.
In tracing the origins of the primary drivers behind these strategies, this study finds that
China's realist drive stems largely from its particular vision of economic and geopolitical growth;
Japan's drive for a resolution to the kidnapping issue stems from jockeying for domestic political
popularity as well as a rapid reconfiguring of its perception of North Korea; Russia's realist drive
derives from the Putin-led push to regain a semblance of its historical sphere of influence; South
Korea's focus on peninsular engagement comes from a renewed nationalism, its legacy as a
"divided nation," and a post-democratization reimagining of national identity in terms of the
North Korea threat; and the United States' concentration on realist factors is derived from unique
aspects of the post-September 11, 2001 security environment.
VI. Policy Implications and Conclusion
In order to present several implications stemming from this project's findings, I now pull
my focus back to the fundamental components that comprise this study's interacting parts. These
include the drivers of strategy at the six-party talks - realist concerns, national political
institutions, and national identity - and the strategy itself, be it engagement, containment, or a
combination thereof. Looking closely at these components will be able to tell us whether or not
the six-party structure might successfully function as a permanent security architecture in
Northeast Asia.
In taking the drivers of strategy at the six-party talks into consideration, two general
patterns emerge that shed light on why agreement on strategy has been such a scarce commodity
throughout. The first is that a realist-based model of hub-and-spokes alliances, such as the one
employed by the United States, risks being ineffective in a multilateral format aimed at threat
reduction if a state and/or its alliance partners hold domestic concerns that are able to co-opt the
goals of the alliance. The U.S. system has been in place since the end of World War II; it is
imperative that as the balance of power shifts in Northeast Asia, the United States develops a
comprehensive policy direction that addresses the economic, security, demographic, and
nationalist components behind this shift in power - while taking into account China's new
regional role as a rising power in particular.254
The second emerging pattern shows that countries holding primarily realist concerns on
an issue do not necessarily agree as to the greatest threat they face. In the North Korea example,
254 James T. Laney and Jason T. Shaplen, "Disarming North Korea."
U.S. policymakers hold the threat as its primary consideration, whereas for other states, the main
concern remains U.S. and/or Japanese dominance in the region. However, this problem is likely
to continue for at least the short term, if not the long term - for U.S. policy toward East Asia is
still "powerfully shaped by the legacies of the Cold War" and inflexible in answering to new
potential dangers and opportunities in the region. It thus currently remains impossible to address
the problems created by the United States' narrow military focus and balance-of-power-based
calculations in the region.255
In terms of the countries' strategies themselves, a combination of engagement and
balancing is of course the most likely over a protracted negotiation period. However, if China,
Japan, Russia, South Korea and the United States expect to see effective results, policymakers in
each need a more thorough understanding of the strategies they are attempting.
I turn again to the formulation offered by Schweller (1998).256 Successful engagement
requires "no irreconcilable conflicts of vital interests among the powers" seeking to engage the
rising state. The engagers must also not judge the rising power's behavior according to principles
that they themselves are unwilling to live by. This calls into question the U.S. and Japanese
refusals to allow North Korea to have a peaceful nuclear energy program in the long run.
On the other hand, for balancing to work, defender states must possess mobility of action
- they must be able to respond quickly and decisively to changes in the balance of power. The
need for a quick response to shifts in power and capability calls into question the dominance of
domestic political influences seen in the strategies of Japan and South Korea, which might stymie
the required rapidity of course change.
Finally, Schweller writes that neither balancing nor engagement is likely to succeed
unless concessions are combined with credible threats, and engagement is viewed as a
complement to balancing rather than a total alternative, and vice-versa. This combined strategy
approach stands in contrast with the little variance seen in the strategies of containment employed
by the United States and engagement employed by South Korea, as well as China's continued aid
flow to the North.
Given all of these conflicting patterns of interaction, the question to be addressed is
whether or not the six-party format can be made into a permanent security architecture, as
255 Eric Heginbotham and Christopher P. Twomey, "America's Bismarckian Asia Policy," Current History,
Vol. 104, No. 683 (September 2005), p. 243-8.
256 Randall Schweller, "Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory," pp. 24-25.
suggested by both Chinese and U.S. policymakers.2 57 The first step necessary would to be to
institutionalize the process by holding meetings on a regular, scheduled basis. Lack of strategy
coordination has led to the North leaving the table as much as it has led to stalemate within the
group.
Making the format a permanent one would also require the U.S. to be willing to engage in
institution-building in Northeast Asia, rather than holding onto its hub-and-spokes model. This
may prove difficult, as states employing a realist calculus often harbor skepticism about attempts
at cooperative security, which are seen as essentially the reflection of the existing distribution of
power. 25 8 Indeed, U.S. actions during the six-party process would suggest their policymakers hold
this view to some extent. However, for the U.S., an institutionalized, multilateral security
framework could in fact serve to justify and legitimize continuing the U.S. alliance system, while
allowing other regional powers to have more direct involvement in managing affairs of regional
security. It could also validate China's status as preeminent regional power, and help quell any
distrust between China on one side and Japan and the United States on the other.25 9
Besides total diplomatic failure resulting in a military crisis, the worst-case scenario in
terms of the six-party proceedings is that North Korea has skillfully taken advantage of the
differences in strategy at the six-party format in order to get exactly what it wants. This could
indeed be the case, as North Korea has been able to build its nuclear capabilities.
In addition, other developments throughout the six-party process do not bode well for
regional cooperation. Countries involved have progressively adopted countermeasures, resulting
in effects not always contributing to wider international cooperation, nor a collective security
mechanism in Northeast Asia. Limited international norm-building and dialogue mechanisms
have emerged, but alongside nuclear hedging and regional tensions. The degree to which the six
parties agree to and follow through with collective action is likely to be the crucial factor in
determining prospects for future cooperation on regional security.260
Northeast Asia is a region undergoing major change. While the North Korea threat so,
too, is the rise of China, the prospect of continued United States dominance, and the potential rise
of Japan as a military power - only a few of many current regional concerns. What is clear from
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this study is that a solely realist understanding of the dynamics at hand will come up short in
explaining state behavior; so, too, will an understanding derived solely from domestic factors.
Scholars and policymakers need to take heed of this in order to minimize the potential for tragedy
in the region and elsewhere, and maximize the possibility of peace.
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requests and interests
Throughout:
Denuclearization
2nd - Reopening of and
satisfactory
investigation and
closure of remaining 10
kidnapping cases
I I
Throughout: Unclear Throughout: Increased
economic access/
opportunities
Sticks: Cutoff of oil
shipments, bank
transactions
Carrots: Oil and food
aid; economic
cooperation (constant)
Sticks: Sanctions on
remittances, trade,
transportation;
inspection of vessels;
threat of use of force
Carrots: Compensation
following normalization
Sticks: None
Carrots: Possible debt
forgiveness
Throughout: Proposing Throughout: Left Throuahout: Warmer Sticks: None
step-by-step, tit-for-tat undrawn relations from
initiatives; promoting Pyongyang, greater Carrots: Aid and
economic cooperation; support for econ. economic cooperation
Incentives only cooperation projects, (constant)
more separated-family
reunions
1V- Solely st - DPRK Throughout: Complete Sticks: Direct and
multilateralism; pressure establishing status as declaration and veiled threats of
tactics; CVID first nuclear state dismantlement military intervention
and regime change;
2 d - Bilateral- 2 d - DPRK continued or increased
multilateral combination; proliferating nuclear economic sanctions
agreement to tit-for-tat material
multilateral agreement but Carrots: Security
still following CVID guarantee, (eased
sanctions)
I I..^I~^.""'~' ~
